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Abstract
Regulation of agricultural groundwater use is increasing throughout the world in re-
sponse to legal and environmental claims on instream flows. Understanding how
farmers make groundwater-use decisions is important to modeling their response to
new policies, as well as to aquifer depletion and climate change. This dissertation
presents two studies that seek to understand the spatial dynamic interaction between
economic agents and physical systems. The approaches presented in each chapter
use field-level data on the Republican River Basin in Nebraska to account explicitly
for spatial heterogeneity in the economic, hydrologic, and agronomic variables that
affect farm decisions. The first chapter is a discrete-time hazard analysis of irriga-
tion technology adoption that assesses the importance of physical heterogeneity on
investment timing. Given nonlinearities and thresholds in the relationship between
physical variables and crop yields, the adoption of irrigation innovations may depend
on parcel-level physical heterogeneity. We find that the sign and magnitude of the
estimated effects of soil quality on adoption are sensitive to specification. The second
chapter assesses whether there is a spatial pumping externality and whether there is
any behavioral response to this externality. A large number of theoretical studies have
considered strategic behavior by irrigators and recent empirical studies find evidence
for strategic overextraction occurring. However, previous studies have not considered
well density and spacing as endogenous to pumping decisions. We incorporate a well
response function from the hydrology literature into a groundwater demand model
in which interactions among spatially distributed farmers arise from spatial pumping
ii
externalities. We find that once endogeneity of well density is accounted for, evidence
for strategic behavior is weak. Overall, the dissertation provides a number of impli-
cations for policy design. On one hand, the results from the duration analysis suggest
that parcel-level data are important in understanding the determinants of irrigation
technology adoption. Conversely, results from the spatial econometric analysis are
consistent with myopic pumping behavior by farmers. In the absence of strategic
interactions, policy analysis is greatly simplified because each user can be modeled
independently.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The main body of this dissertation consists of two related chapters. Together they
can be used to assess the effects of physical heterogeneity on the spatial dynamic in-
teraction between farmers and their physical environment. Regulation of agricultural
groundwater use is increasing throughout the world in response to legal and environ-
mental claims on instream flows. Understanding how farmers make groundwater-use
decisions is important to modeling their response to new policies as well as to aquifer
depletion and climate change. The approaches presented in each chapter use field-
level data to account explicitly for spatial heterogeneity in the economic, hydrologic,
and agronomic variables that affect farm decisions. The first chapter is a discrete-
time hazard analysis of irrigation technology adoption that assesses the importance
of physical heterogeneity on investment timing. The second chapter assesses whether
there is a spatial pumping externality and whether there is any behavioral response
to this externality.
The study area is the portion of the Republican River Basin (RRB) that lies in
Nebraska. Figure 1.1 illustrates the study area in reference to the state and Figure 1.2
illustrates the counties that make up the RRB. Agriculture dominates the landscape:
almost 2.6 million acres are devoted to agriculture in the Basin, and 1.25 million
acres in agriculture are irrigated using groundwater pumped from the High Plains,
or Ogallala aquifer. There are very few surface water irrigation rights, so irrigation
is almost exclusively groundwater-fed in the Basin. The Republican River Basin
has been the source of long-term conflict between Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska.
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Because of the litigation and subsequent regulations, a very large amount of field-
level data are available for analysis. Consequently, the analysis benefits from a unique
population data set of all active wells within a large agricultural region that captures
spatial heterogeneity in both hydrologic parameters and user characteristics.
Technology adoption in agriculture is understood to be a complex, dynamic pro-
cess, but previous econometric studies have been limited by data availability. Some
model individual adoption decisions using bivariate analysis on farm-level cross-
section data or small-T panel data (T ≤ 3); diffusion studies use time-series data
to model cumulative adoption for aggregate units. Duration analysis provides an
empirical framework to deal with both cross-section and time series data, so that the
potential determinants of the adoption decision may vary over individuals and over
time.
In Chapter 2, we analyze binary dependent variable time-series–cross-section data
on irrigation technology adoption. In particular, we focus on the role of fine-scale
physical heterogeneity on the probability of investment. We develop a discrete-time
duration model of parcel-level transitions from dryland to groundwater-irrigated crop
production, which incorporates a flexible baseline hazard specification and accounts
for unobserved individual effects. The empirical results highlight the importance of
land quality, hydrologic parameters, and spatial effects in the adoption decision.
The main contribution of this chapter is a clearer understanding of the role of
land quality in the relative profitability of irrigation. It is understood that the rela-
tionship between land quality and irrigation technology adoption may be nonlinear
and non-monotonic. Given nonlinearities and thresholds in the relationship between
physical variables and crop yields, the adoption of irrigation innovations may depend
on parcel-level physical heterogeneity. However, previous econometric studies have
used specifications that do not allow non-monotonicity to be identified. The results
of this study suggest that the relative profitability of irrigation is non-monotonic
2
in land quality: the probability of adoption is greater on intermediate quality land
relative to high quality land, but the probability of adoption is less on low quality
land relative to high quality land. We also find that the estimated effects of land
quality on adoption are sensitive to assumptions regarding the functional form of the
relationship.
There is a debate in the literature about how quantitatively important externali-
ties and strategic behavior are in determining welfare losses from inefficient manage-
ment of common property resources. Groundwater is a common property resource
that is characterized by fixed users in space and spatial-dynamic externalities. Profits
derived from groundwater-irrigated production are interdependent for farmers that
pump from a common aquifer. Whether irrigators are behaving strategically or not,
and the impacts of their behavior on the aquifer they share, has important implica-
tions for the design of groundwater management policies and the long-term viability
of irrigated agriculture. In Chapter 3, we evaluate econometrically whether drawdown
in a large aquifer is consistent with strategic behavior by irrigators.
The innovation of the empirical approach is that we consider well density and
spacing as endogenous to pumping decisions. This is in contrast to previous theo-
retical and empirical studies that have assumed well location and density are exoge-
nous to pumping behavior. We develop a model of groundwater interactions among
spatially-distributed farmers. Using well-level data, we estimate a spatial error model
of water level drawdown considering profit-maximizing pumping behavior and neigh-
bor interactions. Results are consistent with myopic pumping behavior by irrigators
in the Republican River Basin, and there is no strong evidence of strategic behavior
in pumping decisions.
Our analysis represents three contributions to the economic literature on ground-
water management. First, we address two identification problems, namely endogene-
ity of well location and spatial autocorrelation in unobservables. Second, we use
3
a novel approach to measure the externality that relies on a hydrological transfer
function that connects pumping at individual wells and drawdown observed at mon-
itoring locations. Together the results of the two papers suggest a number of ways in
which policy analysis needs to incorporate physical heterogeneity in order to under-
stand better how individual economic behavior responds to policy or environmental
changes.
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Chapter 2
The Role of Physical Heterogeneity
in Technology Adoption
Abstract
In this chapter, we apply econometric methods to analyze parcel-level irrigation tech-
nology adoption over time. Most previous empirical studies that investigate the
relationship between land quality and irrigation technology adoption find that land
quality variables drive investment (Nieswadomy, 1988; Lichtenberg, 1989; Negri and
Brooks, 1990), but these studies rely on data aggregated to county or regional levels
and do not account for parcel-level physical heterogeneity, which influences farm pro-
duction decisions. This study accounts for the distribution of land quality at the field
level, and spatial heterogeneity in hydrologic characteristics that influences pumping
costs. The analysis relies on a geospatial database that includes hydrologic variables
of every parcel that contains agricultural land in Chase County, Nebraska, obtained
from the Chase County Tax Assessor’s online database. This population database
covers the time period 1961–2000. We develop a discrete-time duration model of
parcel-level transitions from dryland to groundwater-irrigated crop production, which
incorporates a flexible baseline hazard specification and accounts for unobserved in-
dividual effects. The empirical results highlight the importance of land quality, well
yield, depth to groundwater, and spatial diffusion effects.
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2.1 Introduction
It is well understood that land quality is an important determinant of agricultural
production decisions (Caswell and Zilberman, 1986; Lichtenberg, 1989; Negri and
Brooks, 1990; Schoengold et al., 2006). Theoretically it is understood that the rela-
tionship between land quality and irrigation technology adoption is driven by the rel-
ative profitability of adoption. Following the theoretical model developed in Caswell
and Zilberman (1986), evidence from empirical studies has supported the hypothe-
sis that modern irrigation technologies are land-quality augmenting. However, those
profit differentials may have a nonlinear relationship with, and even a non-monotonic
relationship, with soil quality.
The economic literature on technology adoption generally analyzes the adoption
decision in the context of socioeconomic, demographic, and structural factors, or
the rate of diffusion of innovation through time (Feder et al., 1985; Besley and
Case, 1993). Previous econometric studies have been driven by data availability.
Two econometric approaches dominate the literature. Some model individual adop-
tion decisions using bivariate analysis on farm-level cross-section data or panel data
(Koundouri et al., 2006; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2004; Foltz, 2003). Studies with
longer time series have analyzed the diffusion of technology across aggregate units
(Ding et al., 2009; Kim and Chavas, 2003; Lichtenberg, 1989).
Adoption is a dynamic process involving individual producers. Obtaining time-
series data on individuals is difficult, which restricts the researcher either to framing
dynamic problems in a static setting that ignores the effects that time-varying char-
acteristics have on adoption, or to omitting the farm characteristics that drive some
farms to adopt earlier than others.
An alternative approach is discrete-time duration analysis, which allows the re-
searcher to model the time to adoption for individual land operators. Duration anal-
8
ysis allows the characteristics that influence the adoption decision to vary over time
and individual in a large N–large T data framework (T ≥ 10), an empirical setting
where many panel estimators are infeasible (Beck et al., 1998). Duration analysis has
been widely employed in labor economics (Jenkins, 1995), but there are fewer exam-
ples in the technology adoption literature (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993; Kerr and
Newell, 2003) and agricultural economics (Carletto et al., 1999; Burton et al., 2003;
Dadi et al., 2004; Alcon et al., 2011).
In econometric studies of irrigation technology adoption, it is often implicitly as-
sumed that the relationship between land quality and adoption probability is linear
and monotonic. This implies that the profit differential is greater on lower qual-
ity lands than on higher quality lands. Thus it is commonly found that irrigation
technology adoption is land-quality augmenting. One reason for this is data avail-
ability. Historically, farm-level cross-section–time-series data have been difficult to
obtain. The results in this chapter extend analysis beyond the data limitations of past
empirical work on irrigation technology adoption by incorporating time-series–cross-
section data, which include field-specific land quality information. By incorporating
data on a much finer scale, this analysis suggests important implications for policy
design with respect to groundwater demand for irrigation.
This chapter is laid out as follows. We present a conceptual framework to mo-
tivate econometric analysis. Following this, we present the econometric model and
discuss potential issues for estimation. We then discuss the development of irrigated
agriculture in our study area, Chase County, Nebraska, and describe the data. In the
next section the results are presented and analyzed. A discussion of the implications
and possible extensions concludes.
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2.2 Conceptual framework
There are i ∈ {1, . . . , N} parcels and t ∈ {1, . . . ,∞} years. Consider a farmer
that has the option each year to adopt irrigated production or to remain in dryland
production for the upcoming growing season in year t. We assume that agricultural
parcels remain in irrigated production in all years following adoption. Let pi0 represent
dryland profits and pi1 represent irrigated profits. The value of adoption is given by
Vit = E[
∑∞
s=t
δs(pi1is − pi0is)]−Kit (2.1)
where E[
∑∞
s=t(pi
1
is − pi0is)] is the expected profit differential between irrigated and
dryland production, δs, and Kit are the fixed costs of adoption. Farmers will adopt
irrigated production if the expected value of adoption is positive. The time to adop-
tion depends on parcel characteristics, and spatial-temporal diffusion processes. The
probability that investment on parcel i occurs during time period t is greater when the
parcel characteristics imply lower pumping costs and a greater crop yield differential,
and when the fixed cost is low.
The potential for enhanced crop yields increases the value of adoption. Irrigation
technology is considered land quality-augmenting in the sense defined by Caswell
and Zilberman: by substituting capital and energy for the inherent water absorption
capabilities and water-holding capacity of the soil, technology enhances the ability
of lower quality land to provide water and nutrients for crops, thereby reducing the
productivity differentials between lower and higher qualities of land (Caswell and
Zilberman, 1986). This suggests that the value of irrigation adoption increases as the
land quality decreases.
For the initial adoption of irrigation technology on non-irrigated land, relatively
low pumping costs also increase the value of adoption. Variable pumping costs are
affected by pumping lift and well yield. Pumping lift describes the depth from which
10
groundwater must be pumped. A farmer’s value of irrigation adoption increases as
pumping lift decreases. Well yield is defined as the volume of water that can be
pumped from a well per unit of time. The value of adoption is increasing in well
yield.
The fixed costs of adoption Kit include the capital costs of well-drilling and in-
stalling groundwater irrigation equipment and the spatial-temporal effects of the dif-
fusion of innovation. Changes in agricultural policies and technological innovations
in pumping and irrigation technologies over time affect the capital costs of invest-
ment. Spatial-temporal factors such as information gathering, learning by doing, or
accumulating resources have also been identified as factors that affect the adoption
decision (Feder et al., 1985; Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993; Koundouri et al., 2006).
A farmer’s expectations about the value of adoption are influenced by the irrigation
adoption at neighboring parcels. Since many of the physical characteristics that af-
fect the value of adoption are spatially correlated, neighbors’ adoptions signal to the
farmer that the value of investment is positive. Social interactions may be a direct
signal to the farmer, and spatial patterns may be an indirect signal. As the number of
adoptions at neighboring parcels increases, the value of irrigation adoption increases.
Strategic behavior might also explain positive spatial effects. If a farmer observes
their neighbor drilling a well to extract an exhaustible resource, the value of irriga-
tion in the current time period increases relative to future periods because the life of
the resource is decreasing.
The effect of the crop yield advantage of irrigation on adoption is greater if con-
ditions induce farmers to expect higher future crop prices. This crop price effect
varies across time, but market prices are system-level effects that do not vary across
parcels. Consider a case where wheat is the most profitable crop choice for dryland
production, and corn is the most profitable crop choice for irrigated production. If
institutions and market conditions cause farmers to expect higher (lower) corn prices
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relative to wheat prices in the future, then the value of switching from dryland wheat
to irrigated corn increases (decreases).
2.3 Econometric model
Discrete-time duration models are appropriate when the underlying transition process
is intrinsically discrete or when continuous survival times have been grouped into
discrete intervals of time, so called “grouped data” models. In this particular case,
well-drilling is a continuous-time process, but irrigation adoption decisions are related
to discrete crop production cycles. Farmers must invest in irrigation before planting
takes place in the year of adoption, hence the appropriateness of a discrete-time
framework. We don’t observe a farmer’s value function for parcel i, Vit. We instead
observe the date that an irrigation well was completed. The value function can be
expressed as a latent variable model, where we only observe the first year in which
Vit > 0. Given the opportunity cost of dryland production once irrigation investment
is made, we assume no disadoption over the life of initial capital investment. Given the
annual nature of crop production, we assume that irrigated production commences
in the year following completion of the well.
The approach followed in this analysis is based on the work of Allison (1982) and
Jenkins (1995). Agricultural parcels in dryland production in year t are indexed by
i = 1, . . . , n. Let time be measured in discrete intervals indexed by t ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . },
where each interval represents one calendar year. In year t = 1, we observe each parcel
i = 1, . . . , n in dryland production. The probability that parcel i adopts irrigated
production in year t is given by the discrete-time hazard function, λi(t),
λi(t|xi) = Pr(Ti = t|Ti ≥ t,xi) (2.2)
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where xi is a vector of parcel characteristics that may vary with time, and Ti is a dis-
crete random variable representing the time that parcel i adopts irrigated production
with a cumulative distribution function, F (t), and a density function f(t).
The likelihood contribution for a parcel that remains in dryland production at
least until year t is given by the discrete-time survivor function, S(t),
Si(t) = Pr(T > t) = 1− F (t) =
∏t
s=1
(1− λi(s)) (2.3)
and the likelihood contribution for each parcel i that adopts in year t is given by the
density function, f(t),
f(t) = Pr(Ti = t) =
λi(t)
1− λi(t)
∏t
s=1
(1− λi(s)) (2.4)
The likelihood for the whole sample is
` =
∏n
i=1
[(
λi(t)
1− λi(t))
δi
∏t
s=1
(1− λi(s))] (2.5)
where δi is a censoring indicator to account for right censoring. Let δi = 1 if parcel i
adoption is observed during the study period, and δi = 0 if parcel i remains in dryland
production throughout the study period. Now define a binary indicator variable
yit =

1 for Ti = t and δi = 1
0 otherwise
(2.6)
Jenkins (1995) shows that the log of Equation (2.5) can be written as
log ` =
n∑
i=1
t∑
s=1
[yis log λi(s) + (1− yis) log(1− λi(s))] (2.7)
which has the same form as the log-likelihood function for regression analysis of a
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binary variable. By structuring the data so that each section has a record for every
year of the sample, the log-likelihood function for a discrete-time duration model is
identical to the log-likelihood function of a binary regression model.
The hazard function, λi(t|xi) in this analysis is specified using the complementary
log-log (clog-log) functional form, which is recommended when the distribution of yit
is skewed such that there is a high proportion of either zeros or ones (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005). The hazard function in Equation (2.2) is given by
λi(t|xi) = 1− exp [− exp (Λ0(t) + x′iβ)] (2.8)
where Λ0(t) = log λ0(t) is the baseline hazard in year t, which is unknown, xi is a
vector of covariates for parcel i, and β is a vector of parameters that is unknown. The
clog-log specification in Equation (2.8) yields a functional form that is equivalent to
the continuous-time Cox proportional hazard model (1975), which decomposes the
hazard function into a baseline component and a component dependent on parcel
covariates. The baseline hazard, Λ0(t), depends on t, but is independent of the
covariates, xi. Absolute differences in covariates imply proportional differences in
hazard rates.
Since this analysis is primarily concerned with the effects of parcel characteristics
on the probability of adoption, we specify the baseline hazard using a flexible, non-
parametric functional form. Following the procedure suggested by Han and Hausman
(1990), and Meyer (1990), the baseline hazard is specified as a vector of dummy
variables for each year t that irrigation adoption is observed. This procedure has the
advantage of preventing inconsistent estimates for the regression coefficients due to
a misspecified baseline hazard.
In duration analysis, mixture models are used to address identification problems
introduced by unobserved heterogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Jenkins, 2005).
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By omitting unobserved effects, the estimated regression coefficients are likely to be
downward biased, and spurious negative duration dependence is introduced into es-
timates of the baseline hazard. Additionally, the proportional hazards assumption
is violated, so that the estimated effects of the covariates, β, are no longer indepen-
dent of duration. In order to account for unobserved parcel effects, we generalize
the proportional hazards specification in Equation (2.8) by conditioning Ti on the
unobserved random variable vi,
λi(t|xi, vi) = 1− exp [− exp (Λ0(t) + x′iβ + log vi)] , vi > 0 (2.9)
where vi is assumed to be time-invariant and independently distributed of the parcel
covariates, xi, and the density of ln(v), g(ln(v)), is nondegenerate and has finite mean.
The estimation of this model, known as a “frailty model” in the survival analysis liter-
ature, requires specifying a distribution of ln(vi) whose functional form is summarized
in terms of a few key parameters that can be estimated with the available data. Han
and Hausman (1990) and Meyer (1990) find that when the baseline hazard is not pa-
rameterized, regression coefficients are not sensitive to alternative parameterizations
of unobserved parcel effects. The Gamma distribution and the Normal distribution
have been commonly used. We compare models with ln(vi) parameterized using the
Normal distribution and the Gamma distribution.
2.4 Data
This study is based in Chase County, Nebraska. Over 85% of the total land area was
classified as agricultural land by the Chase County Assessor for the 2007 tax year.
27% of this agricultural land is certified for irrigation, which is 23% of the total land
area. There are no surface water irrigation rights in Chase County. Figure 1.2 gives
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the location of Chase County, relative to the other counties in the RRB.
The terrain of the northern High Plains is dominated by sandy soils and low pre-
cipitation. The water-holding capacity of the soil makes surface irrigation techniques
like gravity systems impractical and costly, so historically cropland was typically de-
voted to producing less water sensitive crops such as hay and wheat (Lichtenberg,
1989). However, Chase County is underlain by the Ogallala Formation, whose geologic
properties make large-scale pumping at shallow levels possible, given the appropriate
technology (Torell et al., 1990). By the mid-1960s, the development of center pivot
irrigation technology and the availability of inexpensive electric power made produc-
tion of water sensitive crops, such as corn and soybeans, possible on marginal lands
that were previously considered unirrigable (Center for Rural Affairs, 1976).
Groundwater use in Nebraska is governed by Natural Resource Districts (NRDs).
Irrigation wells must be registered with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR).
The DNR Wells Database gives data on current owner, spatial location, and pump-
ing characteristics measured at the time that the well was installed. Water use for
irrigation in Chase County is regulated by the Upper Republican NRD, which has a
unique regulatory history: well metering began in 1978; volumetric restrictions since
1982; and a well-drilling moratorium for new wells has been in place since 2000. Ad-
ditionally, irrigation rights are tied to a specific parcel. In contrast, in many areas
groundwater use for irrigation has largely been unregulated and unmonitored.
Tax assessor data for the 2007 tax year contain detailed information on past sales,
current owner information, acres in dryland agriculture and irrigated agriculture, and
land quality information for each plot within the parcel. Parcel location is identified
at the section level, which is classified according to the Public Land Survey System.
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2.4.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable in this study is the probability that parcel i transitions from
dryland to irrigated crop production in year t, conditional on dryland production
up to year t. The time period for the sample covers 1961–2000. Using the stock
data on parcels and the flow data on well registration, we assume that parcels with
agricultural land are in dryland production, if there is no well registered at that parcel.
If a well is registered on parcel i sometime during the year t − 1, then we assume
that the parcel adopts irrigated production for the growing season in year t. Time
in dryland production is measured by a sequence of dummy variables yit. For parcels
that adopt irrigation, yit = 0 for all periods except for the year that an irrigation well
was registered. Figure 2.1 gives the total annual adoptions and cumulative adoption
for the study period.
We make two assumptions in this implementation that need to be addressed. The
first is left-censoring. The starting year for the study period is arbitrary. The choice
of start date determines the number of parcels included in the sample. Choosing an
earlier year adds parcels, and choosing a later year decreases sample parcels. Prior
to 1960, only 25 registered wells were installed in Chase County. The first reported
well was drilled in 1899. Center-pivot irrigation was first patented in 1957. Between
1957 and 1960, only 7 wells were installed. Without a reason to choose one starting
year over another, we assume the loss of information on up to 25 parcels, given data
on 2,139 parcels, is not going to cause significant sampling bias.
We also assume that disadoption does not occur. Once a parcel is irrigated,
it is dropped from the analysis in all years after adoption. Adoption is assumed
to be irreversible because replacement wells are dropped from the data and well
abandonment is rare in the RRB. This is in contrast to patterns observed in other
regions that exploit the High Plains aquifer, such as parts Texas and western Kansas,
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where declining well yields have prompted the conversion of irrigated land to dryland.
2.4.2 Explanatory variables
Land Capability Groups (LCGs) are defined by the Nebraska Department of Revenue
to rank agricultural fields according to their relative productivity for dryland crop
production. Agricultural land is assigned to one of four categories, with LCG 1 being
the most productive soils, based primarily on soil type, slope, and erosion. This
classification is standardized at the state level. In Chase County, 21% of the total
agricultural land are in LCG 1, 13% are in LCG 2, 15% are in LCG 3, and 51% are
in LCG 4. For each parcel i, we define four soil variables, Prop. 1 – Prop. 4, which
represent the proportion of total agricultural acres in each land capability group.
The data on pumping water levels and well yields were taken from Nebraska DNR
well database. These data reflect measurements reported at the time of installation.
In order to approximate groundwater characteristics for parcels that remain in dry-
land production, well data are interpolated to section centroids. Section centroids
were calculated using shapefile data on the Public Land Survey System in Nebraska,
which were obtained from the Nebraska Geospatial Data Center.
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for time-invariant variables. Parcels are
grouped according to their production status in 2000, the year that the well-drilling
moratorium was enacted in the Upper Republican NRD. Relative to those parcels that
remained in dryland (non-adopters), parcels that transitioned to irrigated production
(adopters) are characterized by lower pumping costs and more land in intermediate-
quality soils. The last column in Table 2.1 reports the probability value for t-tests that
each variable has the same mean within the two groups (adopters and non-adopters).
Spatial diffusion effects are expected to increase the likelihood of adoption. Spatial
effects are accounted for by two variables: Section Lag accounts for the number of
previous adoptions within each section; Distance Lag gives the number of previous
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adoptions within some distance (1 – 10, 15, 20 miles) of the section. Since parcels
are not geo-referenced, we assume that parcels are located at the section centroid for
distance calculations.
2.5 Results
Table 2.2 reports estimation results from proportional hazard, complementary log-log
models using a non-parametric baseline hazard and three mile cut-off for the variable
Distance Lag.1 The dependent variable is the probability of irrigation adoption in
year t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 41}, conditional on dryland production up to that year. For
coefficient estimates for the year dummies, see Table A.1 in the Appendix.
Theoretical findings suggest that the omission of unobserved heterogeneity un-
derestimates the degree of positive duration dependence in the baseline hazard, i.e.
parcels appear less likely to transition to groundwater-irrigated agriculture as time
passes, and bias the magnitude of other covariates downward. Figure 2.2 illustrates
this relationship, which compares the predicted survivor functions for a frailty model
(the random effects model) and a model that assumes no significant parcel effects
(pooled model), evaluated at the mean of the covariates.
The frailty models account for unobserved parcel effects, while the pooled model
assumes the effects are not significant. The frailty models can be compared with the
non-frailty models by testing the significance of the variance parameter, or by a likeli-
hood ratio test. The variance parameter is significantly different from zero assuming
normal and gamma frailty, and likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypotheses of ‘no
significant individual effects.’
Exponentiated coefficients are reported in Table 2.2. Coefficients expressed in
this form give the proportionate change in the hazard given a one-unit change in
1Models using alternative lags up to 20 miles were estimated. The three mile lag was selected
based on Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion.
19
the covariate. Coefficients greater (less) than one imply a positive (negative) effect
on adoption. The effects of pumping costs on adoption are determined by the hy-
drologic parameters ln(Well Yield) and ln(Depth). The coefficient estimate for the
variable ln(Well Yield) is positive and significant, while the estimated coefficient for
the variable ln(Depth) is negative and significant. Higher well yields imply higher
pressurization, so that less pumping time is required to extract a given amount of
water. This implies that variable pumping costs are lower. In contrast, variable
pumping costs are decreasing in depth. Taken together, these coefficients imply that
the probability of adoption is decreasing in relative pumping costs.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the effects of variation in hydrologic parameters on the pre-
dicted survivor function. Predicted survivor functions are generated assuming rel-
atively low pumping costs (high well yield, low pump lift), average pumping costs,
and high pumping costs (low well yield, high pump lift). Average pumping costs are
evaluated at the sample mean of the variables. Relatively low (high) pumping costs
are evaluated at one standard deviation above (below) mean well yield, and at one
standard deviation below (above) mean pump lift. All other covariates are evaluated
at the sample mean. Figure 2.3 illustrates the result that parcels with relatively low
pumping costs are more likely to adopt.
The coefficient estimates for the variables Prop. 2 – Prop. 4 are estimated relative
to Prop. 1. The coefficient estimates for Prop. 2 and Prop. 3 are positive and
significant, which implies that the probability of adoption is decreasing in land quality.
The coefficient estimate for Prop. 4 is negative and significant, which suggests that
the probability of adoption is increasing in land quality for the lowest land qualities.
These estimates suggest a non-monotonic, nonlinear relationship between land quality
and adoption. The importance of land quality is illustrated graphically in Figure 2.4,
which gives the predicted survivor functions for parcels that are classified in each of
the land capability groups. Each of the four parcels differ only with respect to land
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quality; in this way, the non-monotonicity of the relationship between adoption and
land quality is clearly expressed.
Spatial effects were positive and significant in the duration model. Note that
the coefficient estimate for the variable Section Lag is much larger in magnitude
than the coefficient estimate for the variable Distance Lag. These coefficients can
be interpreted as spatial diffusion processes, but multiple relationships, such as so-
cial interactions or strategic behavior, could explain this result. Thus, behavioral
interpretations of these results are limited.
The coefficient for the variable Acres is positive and significant. The dominant
irrigation technology in the study area is center-pivot, which is primarily designed to
irrigate 160 acre quarter sections. With this in mind, parcels that are much smaller
than quarter sections are unsuitable for center-pivots, while parcels larger than quar-
ter sections can accommodate the technology. Future work should investigate whether
using dummy variables to account for parcel size generates coefficient estimates that
offer more clear economic interpretations.
2.6 Discussion
Irrigation adoption decisions can be understood in terms of the relative profit differ-
entials between dryland and irrigated production. Profit differentials are determined
by differences in crop yields and differences in production costs. Previous research has
identified multiple sources of nonlinearity between crop yield and biophysical param-
eters, such as soil fertility, precipitation, and temperature (Antle and Capalbo, 2010).
The implication of a nonlinear crop yield response to physical heterogeneity is that the
relative profit differentials may also exhibit nonlinear, and even non-monotonic, rela-
tionships with these parameters (Caswell and Zilberman, 1986). Understanding how
adoption decisions vary with heterogeneous soils, climate, and farm characteristics
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is therefore critical for accurate policy analysis. However, most existing econometric
studies have used specifications that restrict the farm adoption response to be mono-
tonic in soil quality. Below we consider two illustrative examples of how different
specifications of physical heterogeneity can lead to different policy outcomes.
How would assuming linearity and monotonicity affect model predictions? In or-
der to assess the impacts of these assumptions, estimates from the econometric model
are presented in Table 2.3 using three different parameterizations of land quality: (1)
the proportionate relationship used in this chapter that allows for non-monotonicity
and nonlinearity; (2) the relationship between land quality and adoption is linear
and monotonic; (3) the relationship is quadratic. Let the variable Land quality in-
dex represent the area-weighted linear index of agricultural land on a parcel. Larger
(smaller) values for Land quality index imply relatively lower (higher) land quality.
In the linear model, the estimated land quality coefficient is negative and significant,
which implies that the probability of adoption is increasing in land quality (Table
2.3). This result is in contrast to both the theoretical and empirical literature, which
finds the probability of irrigation adoption to be decreasing in land quality. Using
the quadratic model, coefficient estimates imply that the probability of adoption is
decreasing in land quality up to a point in between LCG 2 and LCG 3 (∼ 2.4), but
increasing in land quality thereafter.
We consider two explanations for these differences. One possible explanation for
these results is that 51% of agricultural land in Chase County is classified in the
lowest land capability group (LCG 4). As illustrated in Figure 2.4, the probability
of adoption is lowest for this land. Estimation that assumes linear and monotonic
functional forms yields biased coefficients in part because of the skewed distribution
of land quality. Previous studies that have been based on surveys are likely to have
over-sampled relatively high quality land. This could explain the reversal of sign on
a linear coefficient.
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It is straightforward to demonstrate how these results lead to different predicted
outcomes in a simple climate change analysis. Consider the case where agricultural
land in LCG 1 – 3 become marginally less productive in the study area. Agricultural
land that is currently capable of producing high yields (LCG 1) becomes moderately
high yielding (LCG 2), and so on. We also assume that agricultural land classified
in LCG 4 remains in this grouping. Table 2.4 gives the predicted sign of a marginal
change in land quality for the models given in Table 2.3, which compares different
land quality specifications. A positive (negative) sign implies that adoption is more
(less) likely as land quality decreases. Note that the signs of the change vary across
models, implying that some models predict increased irrigation adoption, and others
predict decreased irrigation adoption, as a result of climate change. If the relationship
between land quality and irrigation adoption is non-monotonic, then county-level
analyses that do not account for this would predict irrigation water demands, and
adoption or disadoption trends in the wrong direction.
In order to meet interstate obligations and environmental flow constraints, there is
increasing interest in retiring groundwater-irrigated land by buying out well-pumping
rights. The marginal value of pumping depends on pumping costs and the difference
in crop yields. Differences in well pumping costs are driven by heterogeneity in hy-
drological parameters. Groundwater conservation programs may be inefficient if dif-
ferences in pumping costs are ignored. For example, payments in the Upper Arkansas
River CREP, in southwest Kansas, are based on soil type and location relative to the
stream, but not hydrologic parameters. If hydrologic parameters are not correlated
with soil type, then this payment may not be cost-effective. A program that considers
heterogeneity in both soil type and hydrologic conditions could be more cost-effective.
Our results suggest several worthwhile extensions. Expanding the study area
across the basin will give us more spatially variable historical climate data. Greater
cross-sectional variability in climate variables might allow us to explore the histori-
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cal relationships of irrigation adoption to climatic patterns. With data on multiple
counties, future research could explore the relationships between parcel-level data and
county-level analysis. The statistical model specified in this chapter restricts analysis
to the time of first adoption for each parcel. In order to analyze irrigation adoption at
a more aggregate scale, alternative frameworks should be investigated. Another pos-
sible methodological extension is the explicit specification of spatial effects in order
to correct for potential bias and inefficiency.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Time-Invariant Variables
Parcels Diff. in Means
Variable All Adopt=0 Adopt=1 Ho: diff = 0
Parcel-level variables
Acres 229 222 238 0.035
Prop. 1 0.259 0.268 0.248 0.222
Prop. 2 0.147 0.109 0.201 0.000
Prop. 3 0.162 0.088 0.268 0.000
Prop. 4 0.431 0.535 0.283 0.000
Section-level variables
Well Yield, gpm 1,650 1,543 1,800 0.000
Pump Lift, ft 146 164 121 0.000
Number of Parcels 2,137 1,251 886
Prop. 1 – Prop. 4 represent the proportion of agricultural land in each Land Capability Group.
Soils are ranked in LCGs 1–4, where LCG 1 represents the highest quality land, and LCG 4
represents the lowest quality land.
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Table 2.2: Discrete-time, proportional hazard models of irrigation adoption
Pooled Gamma Frailty Normal Frailty
Parcel-level covariates
Acres, 1.002∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗
Total agricultural land (10.5) (6.89) (14.3)
Prop. 2, 1.375∗ 2.102 2.503
% agricultural land (2.25) (1.52) (1.75)
Prop. 3, 1.849∗∗∗ 3.145∗ 36.94∗∗∗
% agricultural land (4.47) (2.47) (6.77)
Prop. 4, 0.310∗∗∗ 0.0719∗∗∗ 0.00139∗∗∗
% agricultural land (−9.24) (−7.18) (−12.8)
Section-level covariates
ln(Well Yield), 1.574∗∗∗ 4.525∗∗∗ 21.47∗∗∗
gpm (4.12) (4.63) (7.63)
ln(Depth) 0.466∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.0314∗∗∗
Pumping lift, ft (−7.91) (−5.24) (−9.48)
Distance Lag, 1.011∗∗∗ 1.112∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗
Prev. wells, 3 miles (3.49) (6.45) (9.02)
Section Lag, 1.489∗∗∗ 9.296∗∗∗ 11.85∗∗∗
# prev. section wells (8.69) (8.67) (17.8)
lnσ2v Gamma
Constant 9.303∗∗∗
(14.9)
lnσ2v Normal
Constant 68.04∗∗∗
(45.6)
Observations 54308 54308 54308
AIC 7795.6 7562.9 7502.0
BIC 8169.5 7945.7 7884.8
Log likelihood −3855.8 −3738.4 −3708.0
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.3: Comparison of alternative land quality specifications using the ‘Normal’
Frailty model
Proportionate Linear Quadratic
Parcel-level covariates
Acres 1.011∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗
(14.3) (13.8) (13.2)
Prop. 2 3.073∗∗
(2.61)
Prop. 3 13.04∗∗∗
(5.64)
Prop. 4 0.00742∗∗∗
(−12.2)
Land quality index 0.169∗∗∗ 950.1∗∗∗
(−14.3) (10.3)
Land quality index, squared 0.189∗∗∗
(−12.5)
Section-level covariates
Distance Lag 1.058∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗
(8.82) (11.9) (10.1)
Section Lag 7.320∗∗∗ 9.418∗∗∗ 7.908∗∗∗
(17.3) (19.0) (17.4)
ln(Well Yield) 10.00∗∗∗ 20.46∗∗∗ 14.70∗∗∗
(6.97) (8.95) (8.07)
ln(Depth) 0.0626∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗∗
(−9.38) (−13.0) (−10.3)
lnσ2v
Constant 36.80∗∗∗ 46.91∗∗∗ 38.22∗∗∗
(35.5) (42.2) (34.2)
Observations 54308 54308 54308
AIC 7511.6 7600.8 7529.9
BIC 7894.4 7965.8 7903.8
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.4: Comparison of model predictions
Soil type Proportionate Linear Quadratic
1→ 2 + − +
2→ 3 + − −
3→ 4 − − −
Predictions based coefficient estimates in Table 2.3
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Figure 2.2: Predicted S(t): Unobserved heterogeneity
Notes: Survivor functions are evaluated at the sample mean of all covariates.
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Figure 2.3: Predicted S(t): Pumping
Notes: Average pumping costs are evaluated at the sample mean of the variables ln(Well Yield)
and ln(Pump Lift). Relatively low (high) pumping costs are evaluated at one standard deviation
above (below) mean ln(Well Yield), and at one standard deviation below (above) mean ln(Pump
Lift). All other covariates are evaluated at the sample mean.
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Figure 2.4: Predicted S(t): Soils
Notes: Survivor functions are evaluated at the sample mean of all other covariates.
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Chapter 3
Spatial Externalities and Strategic
Behavior
Abstract
Groundwater is a common property resource where spatial externalities exacerbate
private overexploitation, thereby increasing resource degradation and decreasing pro-
ducer welfare. Understanding the behavioral responses of farmers to spatial exter-
nalities is key to effective groundwater management. A large number of theoretical
studies have considered strategic behavior by irrigators and recent empirical studies
find evidence for strategic overextraction occurring. However, previous studies have
not considered well density and spacing as endogenous to pumping decisions. We in-
corporate a well response function from the hydrology literature into a groundwater
demand model in which interactions among spatially distributed farmers arise from
spatial pumping externalities. We use a spatial error model to explain observed water
level changes throughout the Republican River Basin of Nebraska as a result of well-
level pumping decisions and differences in spatial ownership patterns. In particular,
once endogeneity of well density is considered, evidence for strategic behavior is weak.
3.1 Introduction
In common property resources, it is generally assumed that self-interested users tend
to overextract the resource, which reduces welfare in current and future periods.
Groundwater is a common property resource that is characterized by spatial-dynamic
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externalities (Brozovic´ et al., 2010). Profits derived from groundwater-irrigated pro-
duction are interdependent for farmers that pump from a common aquifer. There is a
debate in the literature about how quantitatively important externalities and strategic
behavior are in determining groundwater dynamics and welfare losses from inefficient
management. Theoretical studies have modeled the divergence between competitive,
strategic, and socially optimal pumping trajectories (Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Negri,
1989; Saak and Peterson, 2007; Rubio and Casino, 2003). Although there are a num-
ber of theoretical studies on strategic behavior in groundwater extraction, there are
few empirical studies owing to the difficulty of obtaining relevant well-level pumping
data.
In this chapter we evaluate econometrically whether drawdown in a large aquifer
is consistent with strategic behavior by irrigators. Our analysis represents three con-
tributions to the economic literature on groundwater management. First, we address
two identification problems: endogeneity of well location and spatial autocorrelation
in unobservables. Second, we use a novel approach to measure the externality that
relies on a hydrological transfer function that connects pumping at individual wells
and drawdown observed at monitoring locations. Finally, the analysis benefits from
a unique population data set of all active wells within a large agricultural region, the
Nebraska portion of the Republican River Basin, that captures spatial heterogeneity
in both user groundwater demand and the externality impacts of pumping. The Re-
publican River Basin is a region of active conflict over agricultural groundwater use,
so understanding farmers’ decisions is fundamental to effective policy analysis.
We develop a model of groundwater interactions among spatially distributed farm-
ers. Using well-level data, we estimate a spatial error model of water level drawdown
considering profit-maximizing pumping behavior and neighbor interactions. Results
are consistent with myopic pumping behavior by irrigators in the Republican River
Basin, and there is no strong evidence of strategic behavior in pumping decisions.
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This chapter is laid out as follows. We summarize the methods and results of
previous studies. Next, we present a conceptual framework to motivate econometric
analysis. Following this, we discuss the history of water conflict in the Republican
River Basin of Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska, and the institutional context in our
study area, the Nebraska portion of the Basin. We then describe the data used in
the analysis and present the econometric model. In the next section the results are
presented and analyzed. A discussion of policy implications and possible extensions
concludes.
3.2 Previous Literature
Groundwater pumping at one well that draws down the water level in the aquifer
increases the pumping lift at neighboring wells, imposing a spatial externality cost on
those well operators. As the water table elevation decreases throughout the aquifer,
farmers may compete to capture the remaining groundwater stock before others can
further increase their costs (Provencher and Burt, 1993). This is the hypothesized
strategic response to the spatial externality.
Two strands of literature are relevant to modeling strategic behavior in groundwa-
ter extraction: theoretical studies of optimal groundwater use; and empirical studies
of common property resources. Theoretical studies have developed models using op-
timal control theory (Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Nieswadomy, 1985) and dynamic
games (Negri, 1989; Provencher and Burt, 1993; Rubio and Casino, 2003) to ana-
lyze the welfare losses associated with common property groundwater extraction. In
general, these models assume homogenous users with inelastic, linear groundwater
demand; pumping costs are linear in depth to water; and spatially uniform resource
dynamics. This last assumption is known as the bathtub aquifer, because extraction
by any given user is immediately transmitted to all users in the form of decreasing
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water table elevation. Gisser and Sanchez (1980) found that for sufficiently large
bathtub aquifers the socially optimal solution converges on the myopic solution be-
cause the externality is increasingly small when spread out over a very large area.
In the game theoretic models of groundwater extraction developed by Negri (1989),
Rubio and Casino (2003) and others, the scope for strategic behavior is bounded from
below by the socially optimal extraction path and from above by the competitive,
or myopic, extraction path. These models find that optimal strategic trajectories
approach the myopic outcome as the number of users increases.
More recent contributions to the literature have recognized that pumping exter-
nalities are spatially heterogeneous and depend on local groundwater properties as
well as the distance between wells. This creates a challenge for theoretical studies
of strategic behavior in such heterogeneous systems because response functions are
idiosyncratic between pairs of wells. Thus, representative users cannot be used in
analysis as exact locations matter. Brozovic´ et al. (2010) ignored strategic behavior
and quantified the magnitude and distribution of the pumping externality, showing
that the externality was extremely sensitive to aquifer properties and well spacing.
Saak and Peterson (2007) used a two user-two period system with strategic inter-
action to show that information about the degree of resource commonality and risk
attitudes could change pumping trajectories and have a significant welfare impact.
In recent years, there have been a number of empirical studies that have analyzed
the importance of spatial aspects of common property resources. For example, be-
cause fishermen are mobile, Smith and Wilen (2003) assume that their observed den-
sity reflects the quality of the biological resource. Hence, it is expected that marginal
extraction costs are relatively low where resource quality is relatively high and ob-
served fishing effort is high. In oil fields, unitization has been developed in response
to overextraction of a fugitive resource (Wiggins and Libecap, 1985). Conversely,
strategic interactions were not found in oil exploration decisions in the Gulf of Mex-
36
ico (Lin, 2009). To date, there have been few empirical studies of common property
groundwater use. One reason for this is that data are hard to obtain. Groundwa-
ter is generally private property and well pumping is not monitored or reported. In
areas where wells are metered, pumping is severely constrained and thus the scope
for strategic behavior is limited. However, preliminary results on groundwater use
in Kansas (Pfeiffer and Lin, 2009) and China (Huang et al., 2009) have found some
evidence for strategic overextraction. Both studies report evidence that as the num-
ber of neighbors increases, so does pumping. However, empirical methods used in
Pfeiffer and Lin (2009) and Huang et al. (2009) do not account for endogeneity of
well location.
3.3 Model
Consider a common-pool aquifer with j = 1, . . . , J irrigation wells that pump ground-
water as an input to agricultural production. We assume that each field is irrigated
by groundwater from a single well. Farmers pump water to maximize profits. Their
groundwater demand is determined by input and output prices, pumping costs, and
the relative yield advantage of irrigated production over dryland production for their
particular field. Let pij(·) denote a well’s payoff to pumping groundwater to the par-
cel it supplies. The single-period payoff is the reduced-form profit function of well j,
which is given by
pij = f(u1, . . . , uj(pj), . . . , uJ) (3.1)
where uj is the annual pumping volume of the jth well. The vector pj represents
observable parcel attributes that affect crop yield, such as temperature, precipitation,
crop evapotranspiration requirements, and soil type, as well as attributes that affect
pumping costs, such as the characteristics of the irrigation system and well hydrologic
parameters. We assume ∂pij/∂uj > 0, ∂
2pij/∂u
2
j < 0 so that benefits are strictly
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increasing and strictly concave in own-well pumping.
Groundwater pumping at one well increases the pumping lift at neighboring wells,
imposing a spatial externality cost on those well operators (Brozovic´ et al., 2010).
Thus, we assume ∂pij/∂uk < 0 for all j 6= k ∈ J , so that benefits are strictly decreasing
in neighbors’ well pumping. The stock externality, or pumping cost externality, is the
increase in pumping costs that pumping at one well imposes on pumping at neighbor-
ing wells. As pumping lift increases throughout the aquifer, the strategic externality
arises from competition among farmers to capture the remaining groundwater stock.
If farmers ignore externality costs entirely, they behave myopically and pump water
until the value marginal product of groundwater extraction is zero (Table 3.1). If
farmers behave efficiently, they incorporate the externality costs on themselves and
their neighbors and pump less than in the myopic case (Table 3.1).
Strategic interactions by groundwater users pumping from a common aquifer could
cause the optimal resource extraction paths to diverge from both the myopic and
socially optimal paths. The reason for this is that users realize that saving water now
will decrease their neighbors’ pumping costs in the future, so that their neighbors will
pump more in the future. This would induce all users to increase current pumping
relative to the socially optimal result. In both the strategic and socially optimal
cases, users incorporate the intertemporal effects of externalities on their decisions.
In the myopic case though, users only consider the current period. As a result,
strategic and socially optimal extraction paths should result in less pumping than
in the myopic case (Table 3.1). In studies by Negri (1989) and Rubio and Casino
(2003), the strategic solution is bounded from below by the socially optimal solution
and from above by the myopic solution. As the number of users increases or the
degree of exclusivity decreases, users’ payoffs to strategic behavior decrease. Results
in Karp (1992) suggest that strategic equilibria converge on the myopic equilibria as
the number of users increases.
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Theoretically, under some circumstances, it could be profitable to pump more
than at the myopic level (where the value marginal product of groundwater is zero),
but this outcome requires additional assumptions about the structure of the model.
For example, if a user pumps so much that his neighbors abandon irrigation and
he captures more of the resource stock at a lower cost in the future, then strategic
over-extraction (resource stealing) may be optimal (Table 3.1).
3.4 Econometric model
Economic research that seeks to identify the magnitude of a spatial externality empir-
ically must seriously consider two identification problems. This first is the standard
type of econometric identification problem due to endogenous explanatory variables.
The relative profitability of irrigated farm production for some parcel i is determined
by the quality of the resource inputs, production technology constraints, and the ir-
rigation decision made at some neighboring parcel j. Likewise, the profitability of
irrigated farm production for some parcel j is determined by the physical characteris-
tics of the parcel and of the production technology, and the irrigation decision made
at parcel i. The local physical characteristics are also correlated with the magnitude
of drawdown and the distribution of wells. The problem arises in testing whether
the pumping decision made at parcel i is affected by the pumping decision made at a
neighboring irrigated parcel j. The pumping decision made at parcel j is a function
of the local hydrological parameters that affect the relative profitability of irrigated
farm production, which is itself a function of the pumping decision made at parcel i
and the local physical characteristics.
The second problem arises because the factors that cause changes in groundwater
demand and changes in pumping lift are spatially correlated. If any of these spatially
correlated explanatory variables are omitted from estimation, then any variable mea-
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suring changes in water table elevation will be correlated with the error term. In
both instances, biased coefficient estimates will result.
The identification issues that we address are variants of the “reflection problem”
and the problem of “correlated in unobservables” discussed extensively in the litera-
ture on social interaction models (Manski, 1993; Bramoulle´ et al., 2009). To the best
of our knowledge, this problem has not been addressed in the empirical groundwater
management literature.
3.4.1 Endogeneity
In the problem we consider, drawdown, well pumping, and the well location decision
are endogenous. One solution to this is to measure drawdown at a point where water
level changes are exogenous. Such locations are provided by monitoring wells, which
have been installed to measure changes in water levels. Since no pumping occurs
at monitoring wells, observed changes in water levels are exogenously determined by
irrigation pumping at neighboring irrigation wells and by recharge.
Consider an aquifer where there are i = 1, . . . , N monitoring wells that are used
to measure changes in the stock of the resource. The locations of the monitoring
wells are known and fixed. Pumping wells are spatially distributed with known, fixed
locations relative to each other and relative to the monitoring wells. However, because
the magnitude of the externality decreases with distance, not all of the pumping wells
influence water levels at all monitoring wells. For each monitoring well i, there exists
a subset of pumping wells j = 1, . . . , J that influence water levels. This subset is
determined by distance, local hydrologic properties, and the seasonality of pumping.
The variable effects of distance on the magnitude of the externality are shown in
Figure 3.1.
For any monitoring well, the drawdown over some time period is the change in
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water levels
yi =
J∑
j=1
ujφij −Ri (3.2)
where φij is the transfer coefficient linking pumping to drawdown at the monitoring
well and Ri is recharge from precipitation over the same time period. For an areally
extensive aquifer in a region with rich spatial variation in normal rainfall patterns,
changes in precipitation need to be accounted for. Note that there are other sources
of recharge such as return flow, which are endogenous. The transfer function, φij, is
the marginal externality imposed on well i by pumping at well j, which is determined
by the distance between the wells and by hydrologic parameters. See Appendix A.2
for a derivation of the transfer coefficients.
The econometric model that relates pumping for irrigation to water-level changes
in an aquifer is given by
yi +Ri = α + β
J∑
j=1
umj φij + γzi + vi (3.3)
where umj is the optimal annual myopic pumping for parcel j, zi is a variable that
defines the social structure of the pumping wells that neighbor monitoring well i, and
vi is the error term. The model (3.3) can be simplified and written in matrix notation
as
y˜ = αı+ βx+ γz + v (3.4)
where y˜ = y +R and x = um′φ. The variable x can be interpreted as the myopic
pumping externality in feet imposed on monitoring wells by pumping wells. If we
assume that farmers are pumping myopically, β represents the technical efficiency of
the irrigation system, namely 1− return flow. If farmers are not pumping myopically,
then β incorporates both technical efficiency and the adjustment to myopic pumping
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necessary to account for drawdown observed at the monitoring well. Because β
adjusts all pumping equally in the transfer function, it does not capture differences
in strategic behavior driven by differences in well density or ownership. Differences in
drawdown at an observation well related to different social structures of the pumping
wells, such as ownership concentration, are captured by the variable z and coefficient
γ.
Differing pumping strategies by individuals produce different hypotheses about
the sign and significance of β and γ (Table 3.2). If the proportion of applied water
that is return flow is not observable, then the estimates of β cannot distinguish
between myopic and socially optimal behavior. However, it is always possible to
test for strategic behavior using the estimated coefficient γ, because z only includes
information on ownership structure.
3.4.2 Spatial autocorrelation
Another potential identification problem is the issue of correlation in unobservable
characteristics. The value of groundwater pumping for irrigation is determined by
the physical parameters of the field, the climate, and the aquifer. Since many of
these parameters are positively correlated in space, we expect that some components
of the error term are spatially correlated. This problem results in a particular type
of omitted variables bias that is well known in the economic literature as spatial
autocorrelation. Failure to account for spatial autocorrelation results in inefficient
coefficient estimates if the omitted variables are correlated with the explanatory vari-
ables or inconsistent estimates if the explanatory variables are not correlated with
the omitted variables. Anselin (1988) introduced the spatial error model in order to
address the problems posed by spatial autocorrelation, which specifies the error term
as
v = λWv +  ,  ∼ N(0, σ2In) (3.5)
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where W is referred to as the spatial weights matrix. This N × N matrix specifies
which of the other observations −i ∈ N affect the value for some observation i.
Specification ofW may be arbitrary if the researcher does not have much information
to guide this choice. As a result, we test a variety of specifications in order to ensure
that our coefficient estimates are not sensitive to specification.
3.5 Study area and institutional context
The study area is the portion of the Republican River Basin that lies in Nebraska.
Agriculture dominates the landscape: almost 2.6 million acres are devoted to agricul-
ture in the Basin, and 1.25 million acres in agriculture are irrigated using groundwater
pumped from the High Plains, or Ogallala aquifer. There are very few surface water
irrigation rights, so irrigation is almost exclusively groundwater-fed. The Republi-
can River Basin has been the source of long-term conflict between Colorado, Kansas,
and Nebraska. In 1942, the three states agreed to the Republican River Compact,
which determined how each state was to share the Basin’s surface water resources for
beneficial consumptive use (Hinderlider et al., 1942). The Republican River Com-
pact Administration (RRCA) was created to guarantee that consumptive use in any
sub-basin did not deplete instream flows to the other sub-basins.
The role of groundwater pumping on stream depletion was not understood at
the time that the Compact was ratified. Prior to the development of center-pivot
irrigation technologies in the late 1950s, the volume of groundwater pumped and
the number of irrigation wells in the Basin were minimal. As a result, consumptive
groundwater use was not regulated by the RRCA. As a result of widespread irrigation
development for agricultural production in Nebraska during the 1960s, groundwater
withdrawals began to reduce instream flows into Kansas. In 1998, Kansas sued Ne-
braska and Colorado for breach of contract on the basis that groundwater extractions
43
of wells in both states were reducing instream flows into the Kansas sub-basins, in
violation of the compact. The Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to conduct
mediations between the states. The Special Master’s ruling confirmed that ground-
water pumping by farmers in Nebraska was reducing surface water availability to
Kansas and compelled Nebraska to reduce groundwater use.
In 2002, the states agreed on a final stipulation that lead to the creation of a
MODFLOW groundwater model (a finite-element numerical model) by the RRCA to
determine historical and ongoing links to groundwater pumping and stream flows in
the basin. The Natural Resource Districts (NRDs) that oversee groundwater use in
Nebraska were required to develop Integrated Management Plans to reduce stream
depletion impacts. Implemented policies included moratoria on well drilling, metering
on all existing wells with mandatory reporting of annual pumping, and pumping limits
on a well basis as determined by historical irrigation records. Regulations have been
implemented on a well-level, rather than a farm-level, and therefore all records are
geospatially linked to individual wells.
3.6 Data
In this section we describe the data and how we integrate it into the econometric
model. We use three kinds of data: hydrological data that describe properties of the
aquifer; well-level data that represent local physical characteristics and ownership;
and estimated myopic pumping amounts for each well.
3.6.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable is the change in water levels observed at each monitoring
well in the Nebraska portion of the Republican River Basin. Data on water level
changes in the basin were obtained from the United State Geological Survey (USGS)
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High Plains Water-Level Monitoring Study, for years in which pumping levels were not
effectively constrained by recent volumetric restrictions. These well data are spatially
referenced and reported annually, and we use data from 1995–1999. Prior to 2004,
restrictions were only in place in the Upper Republican NRD. However, estimates of
profit-maximizing pumping suggest that in the Upper Republican NRD, volumetric
restrictions did not bind during the study period (Palazzo, 2009). Since 1983, per-acre
irrigation allocations in the Upper Republican NRD have been progressively reduced
from 20 inches per year to the current allocation of 13 inches per year. The USGS
assembles static water level measurements recorded at publicly managed monitoring
wells each spring, after water levels have recovered from irrigation during the previous
year. Since monitoring wells are not pumped but have static water levels used for
observation only, the data are not subject to the same endogeneity concerns as the
data on groundwater pumping wells used in irrigation.
Because regional rainfall patterns follow a steep east-west gradient, we need to
control for effects of variable precipitation on drawdown at monitoring wells. Data
on annual recharge from precipitation at each monitoring well were obtained from
input files for the RRCA MODFLOW model.1 Cell size for the MODFLOW model
is one square mile, so we used the recharge for the cell containing each monitoring
well. Thus, the dependent variable in Equation (3.4), y˜ is the difference in water
levels observed in 1995 and 1999, net of recharge from precipitation.
The transfer coefficients φij given in Equations (3.2) and (3.3) express the physi-
cal relationship between pumping at a given irrigation well j and drawdown observed
at a given monitoring well i. The transfer coefficients are adapted from analytical
methods found in the hydrology literature to describe an aquifer’s response to pump-
ing (Freeze and Cherry, 1979; Brozovic´ et al., 2010). The transfer coefficients φij can
1RRCA Model input data files accessed 17 June, 2010. The data are available at
http://www.republicanrivercompact.org/v12p/html/ch00.html.
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be interpreted as the marginal externality cost (in feet of drawdown) at monitoring
well i of pumping one unit of water during the growing seasons from the time pe-
riod 1994–1998 (See Appendix A.2 for details on the transfer coefficient). Note that
pumping externalities are a diffusional process with time lags, so the effects of pump-
ing during the 1994 growing season are observed in January 1995, and so on. Figure
3.1 illustrates how the spatial pumping externality declines over distance for three
different values for the groundwater transmissivity parameter. Transmissivity defines
the speed of lateral groundwater flows at a given point in the aquifer. The values
chosen are representative of the range of observed values in the study area. From
Figure 3.1, we see that pumping from a distance of greater than six miles will have no
impact on water levels in this formulation. Figure 3.2 is a map of the 10,908 active
irrigation wells and the 376 monitoring wells in the basin, illustrating the variability
in the distribution of pumping wells relative to the monitoring wells. Because the
magnitude of the spatial externality for any given well depends on the distance to
the monitoring well, these spatial data can be used to characterize the heterogeneous
impacts of different users throughout the basin.
3.6.2 Explanatory variables
Because of interstate litigation and subsequent regulations, a very large amount of
field-level data are available for analysis. In order to monitor the impacts of con-
sumptive use of groundwater and surface water in Nebraska and Colorado on stream
depletion in the Kansas sub-basins, the Republican River MODFLOW model is cali-
brated to estimate the physical parameters of the hydrologic system, and incorporates
field-level pumping data reported by Natural Resource Districts (McKusick, 2002).
MODFLOW is a cell-based numerical model that models the hydrologic system over
one-square mile cells. The model generates spatially-explicit data on the physical
parameters such as observed recharge and hydrologic parameters that describe the
46
spatial-dynamic flows of groundwater through the aquifer.
NRDs are responsible for collecting pumping data on all of the irrigation wells in
their region. The state of Nebraska maintains an active wells database that reports the
certified irrigated acres, pumping volume, ownership, and other well characteristics.
Each well and owner in the database are assigned unique identifiers. Pumping water
levels for irrigation wells are recorded at the time that the well was installed. Pumping
water levels at a given well j can vary by tens of feet during the growing season in
response to pumping at the well, so intra-seasonal pumping water levels are not
reliable for determining annual changes in the stock of groundwater at a given point
in the aquifer. The median certified irrigated acres for each irrigation well in the study
area is 126.5 acres, a size that is consistent with production on quarter sections.
The data are used to generate two sets of coefficients that enter the econometric
model. The first is the set of transfer coefficients, φij, which define how observed
water levels at a given monitoring well i respond to groundwater pumping for seasonal
irrigation at a given pumping well j. The transfer coefficient φij can be interpreted
as the marginal externality cost in feet at monitoring well i of pumping one acre-foot
of water at well j. The coefficient was derived from methods found in the hydrology
literature (see Appendix A). The parameter φij is a function of the distance between
the wells, the time since pumping began, and hydrologic parameters (transmissivity
and storativity). Since the transfer function is additive in pumping, we can determine
the impact of groundwater withdrawals at all pumping wells on a given monitoring
well i by summing the transfer functions multiplied by pumping at each well.
The second is a set of estimated myopic pumping amounts umj , one for each of
the J wells in the basin. The estimates were calculated using methods developed in
Martin et al. (1984, 1989) and calibrated to agronomic data in the Republican River
Basin. These methods were used to develop Water Optimizer, which is a field-level ir-
rigation support tool developed by researchers at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln.
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Water Optimizer uses nonlinear optimization to maximize field-level profits by simul-
taneously choosing the optimal crop, land, and irrigation choices from the feasible
sets faced by the well operator.2 The optimization algorithm accounts for input and
output prices, crop evapotranspiration requirements, soil type, pump characteristics,
well yield, and pumping lift. The optimal irrigation estimate umj is myopic because
Water Optimizer solves the annual profit-maximizing problem and takes no dynamic
considerations or externalities into account.
Water Optimizer was developed as an irrigation decision support tool for farmers,
is spreadsheet based, and operates on data for a single irrigated field. Palazzo (2009)
rewrote the optimization algorithm and linked it to the geospatial wells database,
allowing well-level estimates of myopic pumping for all wells in the Republican River
Basin to be obtained simultaneously. The estimates produced by Palazzo (2009) were
used in this analysis.
Since well pumping and well density are endogenous, the myopic pumping esti-
mates described above are likely to be highly correlated with variables that describe
the density or size of a pumping well network. Myopic pumping estimates for indi-
vidual wells j are highly spatially correlated because of the nature of the distribution
of physical characteristics, and because areas where irrigation is highly profitable
are more likely to be densely irrigated than areas where irrigation is less profitable.
Since the externality is negligible after six miles (see Figure 3.1), Table 3.3 reports
summary statistics on network characteristics for pumping well networks that lie
within six miles of each monitoring well. Table 3.4 gives the correlation matrix of
different characteristics of the pumping well networks, including the myopic pumping
externality x, total wells, total unique well owners, and measures of network con-
centration, namely the Gini and the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman (Herfindahl)
2The tool and documentation are available at http://www.agecon.unl.edu/wateroptimizer.html.
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indices.3 Any variable pair with correlations greater than 0.5 indicates an approxi-
mately linear relationship. Table 3.4 demonstrates that x, the drawdown associated
with myopic pumping, is highly correlated with the number of wells and owners and
the proportion of irrigated land within each pumping network.
In order to identify strategic interaction among resource users, we include mea-
sures of network concentration in the econometric model given by Equation (3.4).
The Gini and Herfindahl indices are estimated separately in the results that follow.
From Table 3.4, we see that these indices are not highly correlated with the myopic
pumping estimates umj . Higher concentration of ownership indicates that users are in
a less spatially competitive environment than when ownership is less concentrated.
A concentration value of zero corresponds to the perfectly spatially competitive sit-
uation, where all wells in a pumping network belong to different owners. If users are
acting strategically, then we should expect greater drawdown in areas where there
are more owners. This implies that the coefficient estimates for the concentration
indices, Gini and Herfindahl, should be negative if there is strategic overextraction.
In this study, we use both Herfindahl and Gini indices; however, previous studies
that analyze spatial network concentration have suggested that the Gini index is
the most appropriate measure to use. Sen (1976) and Allison (1978) examined the
properties of income inequality measures and proposed a set of axioms that indices
should possess. Spatial network concentration has been studied in the context of
airline networks (Reynolds-Feighan, 1998, 2001; Burghouwt et al., 2003). In that
context, previous studies have found that the Gini index was the only index to satisfy
all criteria. These studies found that the Herfindahl index is sensitive to changes in
the extremes of the population, but that the Gini index is more responsive to changes
in all parts of the distribution. Estimates of the Gini index were also found to be less
sensitive to the distribution of the population.
3See Appendix A.3 for a description of the Gini and Herfindahl indices.
49
3.7 Results
The spatial error model in Equations (3.4) and (3.5) was estimated using maximum
likelihood. The results presented in Table 3.5 were generated using a three-mile con-
tiguity weights matrix for the spatial autoregressive parameter λ. Numerous alter-
native specifications of the weights matrix were tested, including contiguity matrices
with different distance cut-offs and inverse-distance weights. Flexible moment-based
estimations using the approach outlined in Kelejian and Prucha (1999) were also an-
alyzed. The modeling results and coefficient estimates were robust to specification.
Table 3.5 presents coefficient estimates for three, four, and six-mile distance bands
for pumping networks that affect drawdown at monitoring wells. The differences in
the coefficient estimates for the myopic pumping variable, the Gini index, and the
spatial autoregressive parameter are not statistically different between distance bands.
However, coefficient estimates for the Herfindahl index decrease in significance as the
size of the distance band increases. One possible explanation for this result is that
as more pumping wells are added to the network, fewer large outliers appear in the
sample distribution of the variable. Given the hydrologic parameters in the basin, the
six-mile distance fully captures the effects of pumping on drawdown at monitoring
wells (Figure 3.1). Thus, our preferred model uses the six-mile distance band.
Coefficient estimates for Myopic presented in Table 3.5 are statistically significant
and positive. The coefficient estimates for the preferred distance band are 0.698 −
0.714 and are not significantly different from each other. The physical meaning of
the estimated coefficient on myopic pumping, βˆ, may be explained with the marginal
effect of pumping on drawdown at the monitoring well:
∂y˜i
∂uj
= βˆφij (3.6)
Thus, βˆ < 1 implies that not all of estimated myopic pumping transfers to the
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monitoring well. One explanation for this is that the myopic pumping estimates
include return flows. Because irrigation systems are not perfectly efficient, some
of the pumped water is not consumed, but instead recharges the aquifer. Recall
that βˆ captures both technical efficiency of the irrigation system and adjustments
to myopic pumping. Technical efficiencies of well managed center-pivot irrigation
systems are between 70% and 85%, but poorly managed systems may have lower
efficiencies. Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that farmers are pumping their
myopic quantities (Table 3.2).
The coefficient estimates for the Gini coefficient are not statistically significant
for any of the pumping neighborhoods. The coefficient estimates for the Herfindahl
index are positive and significant for the three and four mile pumping neighborhoods.
Positive coefficient estimates for γˆ imply that for three-mile and four-mile neighbor-
hoods, drawdown at monitoring wells is greater. These results are inconsistent with
strategic behavior, since we would expect pumping to be greater as competition in-
creases (as the Herfindahl index approaches zero) among resource users. However,
the coefficient estimate for the Herfindahl index is not significant for the six-mile
pumping network, which is also the size that fully accounts for the pumping wells
that determine drawdown at each monitoring well.
One possible explanation for the difference in significance between the Gini and
Herfidahl indices is outliers. The Gini indices appear to be normally distributed,
but the Herfindahl indices exhibits long right tails. Taking the natural logarithm of
the Herfindahl index results in a more normal distribution. Estimating the regres-
sion models using the transformed Herfindahl resulted in statistically insignificant
coefficient estimates for each of the pumping networks.
Coefficient estimates for the spatial autoregressive parameter λ are statistically
significant, positive, and robust to specification. This result implies that unobserved,
omitted characteristics are positively correlated in space, a result that matches a
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priori expectations. Many of the physical processes that influence resource use are
continuously distributed in space. Some of these processes may be unobserved. Ad-
ditionally, we do not observe demographic characteristics of the users, nor do we
observe the personal relationships among them. All of these unobserved factors are
likely to be positively correlated in space, which introduces the potential for positive
spatial autocorrelation.
It should be acknowledged that if the externality cost is small, then the difference
between myopic and socially optimal pumping will be negligible. In this case, we
would be able to reject neither myopic nor socially optimal pumping (Table 3.2).
However, all previous studies on groundwater use by farmers take myopic or strategic
behavior as the baseline and assume that socially optimal behavior is not occurring.
It is unlikely that individual farmers are adjusting their pumping to account for
multiple bilateral externalities across space and time. Limited survey data suggests
that farmers understand that their pumping costs are affected by their neighbors’
pumping, but do not account for their interdependence in choosing their pumping
levels (Dixon, 1989).
3.8 Discussion
The results of this paper are inconsistent with strategic behavior by farmers. How
can we reconcile our results with previous results in the literature? We will consider
both previous theoretical and empirical results.
From a theoretical perspective, the divergence between myopic and strategic ex-
traction trajectories for common property resources decreases in the number of re-
source users (Karp, 1992; Rubio and Casino, 2003). Karp (1992) considers a common
property nonrenewable resource when the number of users is restricted. He finds that
when there are more than several firms and the stock of the resource is large, firms’
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ability to act strategically is limited, and the noncooperative strategies converge on
the competitive equilibrium. In our study area in the Republican River Basin, con-
tinuous resource extraction has occurred for over fifty years and average number of
farmers within six miles of monitoring wells is 83. Thus, our finding of no strategic
behavior is entirely consistent with theoretical expectations.
Conversely, working papers by Pfeiffer and Lin (2009) and Huang et al. (2009)
develop econometric models of farm groundwater pumping in western Kansas and
China, respectively. Both papers account for the spatial inter-connectedness of ground-
water users and find evidence for strategic behavior in farm groundwater pumping
decisions. We can suggest two possible explanations for the difference between these
results and those presented in this paper. First, the physical setting may be differ-
ent. For example, in parts of western Kansas the stock of the resource is much more
depleted than in Nebraska, with some farmers abandoning irrigation entirely. Thus,
dynamic incentives for strategic behavior may be different. In rural China, irrigated
plots are more than an order of magnitude smaller than in the High Plains, and with
higher well densities there may be more scope for strategic behavior. Second, Pfeif-
fer and Lin (2009) and Huang et al. (2009) do not account for endogeneity between
pumping, drawdown, and density. If higher well densities are found in areas where the
underlying aquifer is relatively high quality, and profit-maximizing pumping is higher
for high-quality aquifers, then we should expect higher drawdown and pumping as
density increases. This could be mistaken for strategic behavior.
Regulation of agricultural groundwater use is increasing throughout the world in
response to legal and environmental claims on instream flows. Understanding how
farmers make water-use decisions is important to modeling their response to new
policies. In much the same way as transfer functions may be used to link pumping for
irrigation to drawdown at monitoring wells, similar transfer functions relate pumping
to stream depletion. The analysis presented here is consistent with myopic behavior
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by farmers and suggests that myopic pumping estimates can be used to estimate
externalities throughout an aquifer. This is an important simplification that will
allow more confidence in policy analysis in aquifers without needing to model complex
strategic interactions between water users.
The results in this chapter suggest several avenues for future research. This chap-
ter focuses on potential endogeneity between well density, aquifer quality, and well
pumping decisions, but there is currently no theoretical model of optimal well den-
sity, nor of how road infrastructure and technological capabilities could influence well
density. Having estimates of myopic pumping, a dynamic aquifer model, and transfer
functions would allow the calculation of welfare losses relative to socially optimal
pumping trajectories in our study area. Finally, in many parts of the world well
densities are much higher than are observed in our study area and energy costs for
farmers are heavily subsidized. For example, in some areas of India many wells are
used to irrigate areas of only a few acres and electricity is free. Strategic behavior in
these areas may be more similar to that observed in oil fields.
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Table 3.1: Alternative behavioral responses to pumping externalities
Behavior Optimality Conditions References
Myopic
∂pij
∂uj
= 0 Gisser and Sanchez (1980)
Socially
∂pij
∂uj
−∑k ∂pik∂uj = 0 Gisser and Sanchez (1980)
optimal
Strategic
∂pij
∂uj
−∑k ∂pik∂uj 6= 0 Negri (1989)
Rubio and Casino (2003)
Saak and Peterson (2007)
Table 3.2: Hypotheses of farm behavior
Behavior Coefficients
Myopic β = 1− return flow
γ = 0
Socially optimal β < 1− return flow
γ = 0
Strategic β R 1− return flow
γ < 0
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics for six-mile networks around monitoring wells
Variable N Mean S.E. Min Max
y, drawdown in feet 376 11.129 7.840 −4.954 34.707
Myopic pumping, cu ft/day 376 7.563 3.883 0.138 20.06
# Wells 376 167.785 91.114 20 470
# Owners 376 82.936 44.953 12 234
Prop. Irr. 376 0.287 0.147 0.037 0.707
Herfindal 376 0.015 0.018 0.002 0.197
Gini 376 0.399 0.066 0.222 0.648
Notes: The myopic pumping rate given here is the umj that is used in Equation (3.3).
Table 3.4: Correlation matrix for variables using a six-mile pumping well network
Myopic # Owners # Wells Prop. Irr. Herf
Myopic 1.000
# Owners 0.5607 1.0000
# Wells 0.6534 0.9443 1.0000
Prop. Irr. 0.7658 0.9013 0.9479 1.0000
Herf −0.2137 −0.4494 −0.3238 −0.3010 1.0000
Gini 0.1484 −0.1583 0.0800 0.0738 0.6676
Myopic is the variable xi from Equation (3.4), which can be interpreted as the total externality
imposed on location i if neighboring pumping wells j ∈ J pump their myopic pumping
quanities,
#Owners is the number of unique groundwater well owners,
#Wells is the number of groundwater wells used in irrigation,
Prop.Irr. is the ratio of irrigated acres to total acres,
Herf is the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index given by Equation (A.4),
Gini is the Gini index given by Equation (A.5).
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
Understanding how farmers make water-use decisions is important to modeling their
response to new policies and to changing environmental conditions. The two chap-
ters in this dissertation represent analyses of different aspects of farm groundwater
management. In Chapter 2, we consider the role of local physical conditions in the
technology adoption decision using discrete-time duration analysis. In Chapter 3,
spatial econometric methods are used to analyze whether farmers behave strategi-
cally in their pumping decisions.
The results have a number of implications for policy design. On one hand, the
results from the duration analysis suggest that parcel-level data are important in
understanding the determinants of irrigation technology adoption. Conversely, results
from the spatial econometric analysis are consistent with myopic pumping behavior by
farmers. In the absence of strategic interactions, policy analysis is greatly simplified
because each user can be viewed independently.
Future analyses could investigate the spatial structure of individual pumping in
more detail. Understanding the responsiveness of farm production to increased cli-
matic variability is an important research question. Previous studies have found
that the number of recent extreme weather events increases the probability of farm
investment in efficient irrigation practices. The analysis in Chapter 2 did not in-
clude climatic variables because data from one county did not offer sufficient cross-
sectional variability. Given the steep regional precipitation gradient, greater geo-
graphic cross-sectional variation in the data might allow future analysis to identify
60
the effects of climatic variability on irrigation adoption. Additionally, including data
from other NRDs within the RRB might allow identification of institutional effects.
Chase County lies within the Upper Republican NRD, which has a longer history of
irrigation regulations relative to the other NRDs within the basin.
The characteristics of the study area analyzed in Chapter 3 suggest that the scope
for strategic behavior is limited. Applying the methods developed in this chapter
to an area where greater incentives for strategic behavior exist might indicate the
extent to which the results in this chapter can be generalized. For example, the
resource stock in much of Kansas is much more depleted than in Nebraska, with
some farmers abandoning irrigation entirely. In some areas of India, well densities
are much higher than observed in Nebraska, and energy costs are heavily subsidized.
Strategic behavior in these areas may be more similar to that observed in oil fields.
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Appendix A
Additional results
A.1 Nonparametric baseline hazard
Table A.1: Coefficient estimates for year intercepts
Pooled Gamma Frailty Normal Frailty
d1 0.00221∗∗∗ 0.00000570∗∗∗ 2.50e− 11∗∗∗
d2 0.00133∗∗∗ 0.00000346∗∗∗ 4.04e− 11∗∗∗
d3 0.00800∗∗∗ 0.0000219∗∗∗ 8.47e− 10∗∗∗
d4 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0000355∗∗∗ 3.90e− 09∗∗∗
d5 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0000612∗∗∗ 1.50e− 08∗∗∗
d6 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0000651∗∗∗ 2.90e− 08∗∗∗
d7 0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0000782∗∗ 5.56e− 08∗∗∗
d8 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.000182∗∗ 0.000000228∗∗∗
d9 0.0343∗∗∗ 0.000288∗∗ 0.000000593∗∗∗
d10 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.000170∗∗ 0.000000530∗∗∗
d11 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.000217∗∗ 0.000000890∗∗∗
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.1 (cont.)
Pooled Gamma Frailty Normal Frailty
d12 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.000172∗∗ 0.000000897∗∗∗
d13 0.0276∗∗∗ 0.000286∗∗ 0.00000186∗∗∗
d14 0.0336∗∗∗ 0.000405∗∗ 0.00000332∗∗∗
d15 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.000452∗∗ 0.00000466∗∗∗
d16 0.0177∗∗∗ 0.000272∗∗ 0.00000331∗∗∗
d17 0.0168∗∗∗ 0.000259∗∗ 0.00000360∗∗∗
d18 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.000231∗∗ 0.00000357∗∗∗
d19 0.0203∗∗∗ 0.000317∗∗ 0.00000526∗∗∗
d20 0.00582∗∗∗ 0.000111∗∗ 0.00000187∗∗∗
d21 0.00679∗∗∗ 0.000128∗∗ 0.00000226∗∗∗
d22 0.00340∗∗∗ 0.0000691∗∗∗ 0.00000121∗∗∗
d23 0.00681∗∗∗ 0.000141∗∗ 0.00000246∗∗∗
d24 0.00688∗∗∗ 0.000148∗∗ 0.00000260∗∗∗
d25 0.00295∗∗∗ 0.0000653∗∗∗ 0.00000116∗∗∗
d26 0.000489∗∗∗ 0.0000112∗∗∗ 0.000000195∗∗∗
d27 0.000487∗∗∗ 0.0000109∗∗∗ 0.000000191∗∗∗
d28 0.00146∗∗∗ 0.0000332∗∗∗ 0.000000579∗∗∗
d29 0.00245∗∗∗ 0.0000563∗∗∗ 0.000000982∗∗∗
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.1 (cont.)
Pooled Gamma Frailty Normal Frailty
d30 0.00790∗∗∗ 0.000185∗∗ 0.00000317∗∗∗
d31 0.00199∗∗∗ 0.0000495∗∗∗ 0.000000851∗∗∗
d32 0.00797∗∗∗ 0.000181∗∗ 0.00000325∗∗∗
d33 0.000497∗∗∗ 0.0000110∗∗∗ 0.000000194∗∗∗
d39 0.000497∗∗∗ 0.0000106∗∗∗ 0.000000190∗∗∗
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
A.2 Transfer Coefficient
The transfer coefficients quantify the externality on water levels at monitoring wells
from seasonal pumping choices made by irrigators. Equations known as well response
functions in the hydrology literature can model the spatial-dynamic relationship be-
tween pumping and water levels, accounting for the hydrologic properties of the
aquifer. Theis (1935) was the first to derive an analytical solution to the transient
well response problem. For a well j pumping groundwater at a constant rate uj from
a confined aquifer, the drawdown xi at a distance rij from the well at time t since
pumping began is given by
xi(rij, Tj, t, ) = uj
1
4piTj
∫ ∞√
r2
ij
S
4Tjt
e−z
2
dz (A.1)
⇒ xi(·) = ujφij (A.2)
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where Tj is aquifer transmissivity at well j and S is the aquifer storage coefficient.
Since the externality is additive (Freeze and Cherry, 1979; Brozovic´ et al., 2010), we
can express the relationship between pumping at wells j = 1, . . . , J on drawdown at
a given monitoring well i as
xi =
∑J
j=1
ujφij (A.3)
From Equation (A.3) we see that the transfer coefficient φij can be interpreted as the
marginal externality impact of pumping one unit of groundwater at well j on location
i. See Freeze and Cherry (1979) for more detailed derivations of groundwater flow
equations.
Following Saak and Peterson (2007), we assume irrigation withdrawals for summer
crops occur during the 75 day period from mid-June to late August. During seasonal
irrigation, pumping creates a cone of depression in the water table that grows wider
and deeper as pumping continues. Seasonal pumping is followed by a 9.5 month
recovery period where groundwater flows restore the height of the water table at a
rate equal to the negative of Equation (A.1).
A.3 Concentration Indices
In order to measure the spatial concentration of well ownership surrounding each
monitoring well, we rely on the Gini and the normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman in-
dices. Each of these measures have been broadly applied to measure concentration
and inequality. In the context of their application in Chapter 3, these variables mea-
sure the size of individual land holdings in relation to the land holdings of their
neighbors. The Herfindahl index is the standard measure of industry concentration
and represents the probability that two randomly selected parcels are not owned by
the same farmer. The Gini index measures of the inequality of a distribution. The
formulas used to calculate the variables are given by the following equations:
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Herfindahl =
[(
∑N
i=1 s
2
i )− 1/N ]
1− 1/N (A.4)
Gini =
N + 1
N − 1 −
2
N(N − 1)µ(
N∑
i=1
pixi) (A.5)
where i = 1, . . . , N is an index of the land owners, each with a share of the total
irrigated land si. In (A.5), µ is the mean land holding, xi is the land owned by
owner i, and pi is the relative rank of the size of the land held by owner i. These
indices range from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates perfect equality and 1 indicates a perfect
monopoly.
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Appendix B
Code for Chapter 2
B.1 Sort tax parcels by Section–Township–Range
(S–T–R)
#!/bin/bash
# Add up irrigated acreages by STR
# First argument is what to extract
STR=(‘ls str‘)
numstr=${#STR[*]}
j=0
while [ $j -lt $numstr ]
do
wells=(‘cat str/${STR[$j]} | cut -f1 -d"."‘)
len=${#wells[*]}
irrig=0
i=0
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while [ $i -lt $len ]
do
#echo ${wells[$i]}
temp=‘grep ${wells[$i]} $1.dat | sed -e ’s/^.*, //g’
-e ’s/ acres.*$//g’‘
#echo $temp
if [ $temp > 0 ]
then
irrig=(‘echo $irrig+$temp | bc‘)
fi
let i++
done
echo ${STR[$j]},$irrig >> str.$1.dat
let j++
done
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B.2 Add up soil quality by parcel
#!/bin/bash
# No need to redo this.
# cat temp.*.match | grep -v ’ S 0 ’ | cut -f1,3 -d"W" |
grep -v "W" | cut -f2 -d" " > wells.one.dat
#This code outputs all wells on a parcel basis, with numbers >1
for multiple wells in a parcel
#n=0
#while [ $n -lt 8 ]
#do
#cat temp.*.match | grep -v ’ S 0 ’ | cut -f1,$[n+1] -d"W" | grep ’ W’
| sed -e ’s/ S.*W /,/g’ -e ’s/P //g’ -e "s/ .*$/,$n/g" >> wells.n.dat
#let n++
#done
#Try to put all of the parcels into a single array to make it easier to
get them into stata in a reasonable format.
#Load these data into an array
#cat wells.n.dat | cut -f1 -d"," | sort | uniq > list.parcels.dat
#cat wells.none.dat | sort | uniq >> list.parcels.dat
#Outpt soil acreage for each parcel in the data set.
parcels=(‘cat list.parcels.dat‘)
nump=${#parcels[*]}
j=0
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while [ $j -lt $nump ]
do
#echo ${parcels[$j]}
temp1=‘grep ${parcels[$j]} chase.dry.dat | grep -A +1 ’1D’
| sed ’s/<\|>/\n/g’ | grep ’\.[0-9][0-9]’‘
temp2=‘grep ${parcels[$j]} chase.dry.dat | grep -A +1 ’2D’
| sed ’s/<\|>/\n/g’ | grep ’\.[0-9][0-9]’‘
temp3=‘grep ${parcels[$j]} chase.dry.dat | grep -A +1 ’3D’
| sed ’s/<\|>/\n/g’ | grep ’\.[0-9][0-9]’‘
temp4=‘grep ${parcels[$j]} chase.dry.dat | grep -A +1 ’4D’
| sed ’s/<\|>/\n/g’ | grep ’\.[0-9][0-9]’‘
if [[ -z $temp1 ]]; then temp1=0; fi
if [[ -z $temp2 ]]; then temp2=0; fi
if [[ -z $temp3 ]]; then temp3=0; fi
if [[ -z $temp4 ]]; then temp4=0; fi
echo ${parcels[$j]}, $temp1 >> soil1.dry.dat
echo ${parcels[$j]}, $temp2 >> soil2.dry.dat
echo ${parcels[$j]}, $temp3 >> soil3.dry.dat
echo ${parcels[$j]}, $temp4 >> soil4.dry.dat
let j++
done
B.3 Add up soil quality by S–T–R
#!/bin/bash
# Add up irrigated acreages by STR
# First argument is what to extract
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STR=(‘ls str‘)
numstr=${#STR[*]}
j=0
while [ $j -lt $numstr ]
do
wells=(‘cat str/${STR[$j]} | cut -f1 -d"."‘)
len=${#wells[*]}
irrig=0
i=0
while [ $i -lt $len ]
do
#echo ${wells[$i]}
temp=‘grep ${wells[$i]} $1.dat | sed -e ’s/^.*, //g’
-e ’s/ acres.*$//g’‘
#echo $temp
if [ $temp > 0 ]
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then
irrig=(‘echo $irrig+$temp | bc‘)
fi
let i++
done
echo ${STR[$j]},$irrig >> str.$1.dat
let j++
done
B.4 Scripts for matching tax parcel to wells
#!/bin/bash
# No need to redo this.
# cat temp.*.match | grep -v ’ S 0 ’ | cut -f1,3 -d"W" |
# grep -v "W"
#| cut -f2 -d" " > wells.one.dat
#This code outputs all wells on a parcel basis, with numbers >1
# for multiple wells in a parcel
#n=1
#while [ $n -lt 8 ]
#do
#cat temp.*.match | grep -v ’ S 0 ’ | cut -f1,$[n+1] -d"W" |
grep ’ W’ | sed -e ’s/ S.*W /,/g’ -e ’s/P //g’
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-e "s/ .*$/,$n/g" >> wells.n.dat
#let n++
#done
#Load these data into an array
w=(‘cat fitted_data/wells.one.dat‘)
numw=${#w[*]}
j=0
while [ $j -lt $numw ]
do
grep ${w[$j]} fitted_data/temp.*.match |
sed ’s/ S.*W//g’ >> out.temp.dat
temp1=‘grep ${w[$j]} grep -A +1 ’..td. 1[A-Z]’ chase.agland.dat
| sed ’s/<\|>/\n/g’ | grep ’\.[0-9][0-9]’‘
if [[ -z $temp1 ]]; then temp1=0; fi
echo ${w[$]}, $temp1
let j++
done
#!/bin/bash
# No need to redo this.
# cat temp.*.match | grep -v ’ S 0 ’ | cut -f1,3 -d"W" |
# grep -v "W" | cut -f2 -d" " > wells.one.dat
#This code outputs all wells on a parcel basis, with numbers >1
# for multiple wells in a parcel
73
#n=0
#while [ $n -lt 8 ]
#do
#cat temp.*.match | grep -v ’ S 0 ’ | cut -f1,$[n+1] -d"W" | grep ’ W’
| sed -e ’s/ S.*W /,/g’ -e ’s/P //g’ -e "s/ .*$/,$n/g" >> wells.n.dat
#let n++
#done
#Try to put all of the parcels into a single array to make it
#easier to get them into stata in a reasonable format.
#Load these data into an array
#cat wells.n.dat | cut -f1 -d"," | sort | uniq > list.parcels.dat
#cat wells.none.dat | sort | uniq >> list.parcels.dat
STR=(‘ls str‘)
numstr=${#STR[*]}
j=0
while [ $j -lt $numstr ]
do
wells=(‘cat str/${STR[$j]} | cut -f1 -d"."‘)
len=${#wells[*]}
i=0
while [ $i -lt $len ]
do
#grep ${w[$j]} fitted_data/temp.*.match |
#sed ’s/ S.*W//g’ >> out.wells.dat
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temp=‘grep ${wells[$i]} fitted_data/list.parcels.dat‘
echo ${STR[$j]}, $temp >> first.try.dat
#temp1=‘grep ${w[$j]} grep -A +1 ’..td. 1[A-Z]’ chase.agland.dat |
# sed ’s/<\|>/\n/g’ | grep ’\.[0-9][0-9]’‘
#temp1=‘grep ${w[$j]} grep -A +1 ’..td. 2[A-Z]’
chase.agland.dat | sed ’s/<\|>/\n/g’ | grep ’\.[0-9][0-9]’‘
#temp1=‘grep ${w[$j]} grep -A +1 ’..td. 3[A-Z]’
chase.agland.dat | sed ’s/<\|>/\n/g’ | grep ’\.[0-9][0-9]’‘
#temp1=‘grep ${w[$j]} grep -A +1 ’..td. 4[A-Z]’
chase.agland.dat | sed ’s/<\|>/\n/g’ | grep ’\.[0-9][0-9]’‘
#if [[ -z $temp1 ]]; then temp1=0; fi
#if [[ -z $temp2 ]]; then temp2=0; fi
#if [[ -z $temp3 ]]; then temp3=0; fi
#if [[ -z $temp4 ]]; then temp4=0; fi
let i++
done
#sed -n ’/, 15/p’ first.try.dat > str.parcels.dat
#echo ${STR[$j]}, $temp >> first.try.dat
#echo ${w[$j]}, $temp2 >> soil2.mult.dat
#echo ${w[$j]}, $temp3 >> soil3.mult.dat
#echo ${w[$j]}, $temp4 >> soil4.mult.dat
let j++
done
#!/bin/bash
#Attempting to pull out all of the non-irrigated parcels
#List out all parcels.
#grep ’^15’ chase.agland.dat | sed ’s/.jsp.*$//g’ |
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uniq | sort > parceltemp.dat
#List out all irrigated parcels
#grep ’^15’ chase.irrig.dat | sed ’s/.jsp.*$//g’ |
uniq | sort > irrigtemp.dat
#diff -a --suppress-common-lines
irrigtemp.dat parceltemp.dat > difftemp.dat
#sed ’/[a-zA-Z]/d; s/>//g’ difftemp.dat > wells.none.dat
w=(‘cat wells.none.dat‘)
numw=${#w[*]}
soil=0
j=0
while [ $j -lt $numw ]
do
grep ${w[$j]} fitted_data/temp.*.match | sed ’s/ S.*W//g’
>> out.no.wells.dat
#temp1=‘grep ${w[$j]} chase.agland.dat | grep -A +1 ’..td. 1[A-Z]’
| sed ’s/<\|>/\n/g’ | grep ’\.[0-9][0-9]’‘
#temp2=‘grep ${w[$j]} chase.agland.dat | grep -A +1 ’..td. 2[A-Z]’
| sed ’s/<\|>/\n/g’ | grep ’\.[0-9][0-9]’‘
#temp3=‘grep ${w[$j]} chase.agland.dat | grep -A +1 ’..td. 3[A-Z]’
| sed ’s/<\|>/\n/g’ | grep ’\.[0-9][0-9]’‘
#temp4=‘grep ${w[$j]} chase.agland.dat | grep -A +1 ’..td. 4[A-Z]’
| sed ’s/<\|>/\n/g’ | grep ’\.[0-9][0-9]’‘
#if [[ -z $temp1 ]]; then temp1=0; fi
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#if [[ -z $temp2 ]]; then temp2=0; fi
#if [[ -z $temp3 ]]; then temp3=0; fi
#if [[ -z $temp4 ]]; then temp4=0; fi
#echo ${w[$j]}, $temp1 >> soil1.dry.dat
#echo ${w[$j]}, $temp2 >> soil2.dry.dat
#echo ${w[$j]}, $temp3 >> soil3.dry.dat
#echo ${w[$j]}, $temp4 >> soil4.dry.dat
let j++
done
B.5 Interpolate hydrologic variables
clear
% Now import the well data from stata
fid=fopen(’Chase/sec ids.txt’);
c = textscan(fid,...
’%f %f %f %f %f %f’,...
’delimiter’, ’,’,’HeaderLines’,1);
fclose(fid);
secID = c{1};
section = c{2};
town = c{3};
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range = c{4};
qy = c{6};
qx = c{5};
% set up output matrix
%depth = zeros(size(c{1},1),1);
fid = fopen(’ /Documents/MATLAB/Chase/wells values.txt’);
p = textscan(fid,...
’%f %f %f %f %f’,...
’delimiter’, ’,’,’HeaderLines’,1);
fclose(fid);
% Define the variables
wellid = p{1};
x = p{2};
y = p{3};
depth = p{4};
gpm = p{5};
X = [x y];
F1 = TriScatteredInterp(X,depth,’natural’);
F2 = TriScatteredInterp(X,gpm,’natural’);
% Create a grid of precipitation values
%[qx qy] = meshgrid(-102.05:.001:-101,40.3:.001:40.7);
qz1 = F1(qx,qy);
qz2 = F2(qx,qy);
% Interpolation
%depth(:,1) = interp2(qx,qy,qz1,seclon,seclat,’cubic’);
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csvwrite(’ /data/Mil/sec gw interps.csv’,[secID section town range qz1 qz2]);
B.6 Generate distance lags
clear
fid=fopen(’/MATLAB/Chase/distance/dist not.txt’);
c = textscan(fid,...
’%f %f %f %f’,...
’delimiter’, ’\t’);
fclose(fid);
sec id = c{1};
lon = c{2};
lat = c{3};
year = c{4};
j=size(c{1},1);
% % Now import the well data from stata
%
% fid=fopen(’distance.txt’);
% c = textscan(fid,...
% ’%f %f %d %d %d %d’,...
% ’delimiter’, ’,’,’HeaderLines’,1);
% fclose(fid);
%
% id = c{3};
% lat = c{2};
% lon = c{1};
% year = c{4};
% county = c{5};
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% nrd = c{6};
dist mat = zeros(j,15);
%First loop pulls out all distances for each point
for wellnum = 1:j
test=vdist(lat(wellnum)* ...
ones(j,1),lon(wellnum)*ones(j,1),lat,lon )*3.2808399*0.000189393939 ;
%Second loop pulls out numbers within a certain distance
distance=1:15;
%multiply by 5260
for i=1:15
dist(i)=sum(test<(i) & year(wellnum) > year);
end
dist mat(wellnum,:) = dist;
end
%dist bands=linspace(1,50,50);
csvwrite(’dist bands.csv’, [c{3} dist mat]);
% fid = fopen(’/Users/jasavage1/Matlab/distance/distance2.csv’, ’wt’);
% fprintf(fid, ’%s\n’,’id,dist bands’);
% fclose(fid);
dlmwrite(’distance/distance2.csv’, ...
[int32(c{3}) distance], ’-append’, ’precision’, 9);
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end
%
B.7 Build data for estimation
////Rebuilding the estimation data set.
clear all
chdir ~/Documents/Stata/Chase/
set mem 1000m
set matsize 1000
set more off
//Read in well Amanda’s well data
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/WellData ///
/well_meters_information_2_10_09.csv" , double
rename well_id wellid
rename section_ section
rename township town
rename rangenum range
rename latdd latwell
rename longdd lonwell
rename pwaterlev pwl
rename cmpldmonth month
keep wellid cert_acres latwell lonwell section town ///
range replacemen cmpldyear month pwl gpm ///
countynum nrddwrnum
///replace gpm=1000 if gpm>1000
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//replace pwl=500 if pwl>500
drop if pwl<=1
recast double section town range gpm wellid
sort wellid
save "wells", replace
outsheet wellid lonwell latwell pwl gpm using ///
"~/Documents/MATLAB/Chase/wells_values.txt", comma replace
///Read in list of wells-parcel matches
insheet using "/parcels/chase/fitted_data/wells.n.dat", clear
set more off
rename v1 parcelid
rename v2 wellid
drop v3
merge m:1 wellid using "wells", keep(3) nogenerate
drop if (replacemen==1)
drop if cmpldyear < 1959
drop replacemen gpm pwl
sort parcelid cmpldyear
by parcelid: ge parcelwells=_n-1
///drop repeated failures
drop if parcelwells > 0
drop parcelwells
save "parcels.n.well", replace
///Read in S-T-R data for all parcels. Data need cleaning
insheet using "~/data/Mil/txtfiles/str.parcels.txt", ///
clear
set more off
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collapse (mean) section town range, by(parcelid)
sort parcelid
merge 1:m parcelid using "parcels.n.well", keep(1 3) nogenerate
///Good so far.
sort wellid
save "parcels.n.well", replace
////Import section-level gw data:
insheet using ~/Documents/data/Mil/sec_gw_interps.csv, ///
clear double
rename v1 sec_id
rename v2 section
rename v3 town
rename v4 range
rename v5 sec_pwl
rename v6 sec_gpm
save "sec_gw_data", replace
///Merge section-level gw data to parcels data.
use "parcels.n.well", clear
set more off
merge m:1 section town range using "sec_gw_data", ///
keep(3) nogenerate
save "parcels.n.well", replace
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////Start here.
////Merge parcel soil data
insheet using "~/data/Mil/txtfiles/soil1.parcels.txt", clear
rename v1 parcelid
rename v2 soilone
save "parcels.soil", replace
insheet using "~/data/Mil/txtfiles/soil2.parcels.txt", clear
duplicates drop parcelid soiltwo, force
merge 1:1 parcelid using "parcels.soil", keep(3) nogen
save "parcels.soil", replace
insheet using "~/data/Mil/txtfiles/soil3.parcels.txt", clear
duplicates drop parcelid soilthree, force
merge 1:m parcelid using "parcels.soil", nogen
save "parcels.soil", replace
insheet using "~/data/Mil/txtfiles/soil4.parcels.txt", clear
duplicates drop parcelid soilfour, force
merge 1:1 parcelid using "parcels.soil", nogen
bysort parcelid: gen acres=soilone+soiltwo+ ///
soilthree+soilfour
save "parcels.soil", replace
use "parcels.n.well", clear
set more off
merge m:1 parcelid using "parcels.soil", ///
keep(3) nogen
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save "parcels.n.well", replace
/*
gen dsoil1=0
gen dsoil2=0
gen dsoil3=0
gen dsoil4=0
replace dsoil1=1 if soilone >= (acres - soilone)
replace dsoil2=1 if soiltwo >= (acres - soiltwo)
replace dsoil3=1 if soilthree >= (acres - soilthree)
replace dsoil4=1 if soilfour >= (acres - soilfour)
*/
gen propone= soilone / acres
gen proptwo= soiltwo / acres
gen propthree = soilthree / acres
gen propfour = soilfour / acres
///Generate section-level soil variables
/*sort sec_id parcelid
by sec_id: egen sec_ac = sum(acres)
by sec_id: egen sec1 = sum(soilone)
by sec_id: egen sec2 = sum(soiltwo)
by sec_id: egen sec3 = sum(soilthree)
by sec_id: egen sec4 = sum(soilfour)
gen sec_d1=0
gen sec_d2=0
gen sec_d3=0
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gen sec_d4=0
replace sec_d1=1 if sec1 >= (sec_ac - sec1)
replace sec_d2=1 if sec2 >= (sec_ac - sec2)
replace sec_d3=1 if sec3 >= (sec_ac - sec3)
replace sec_d4=1 if sec4 >= (sec_ac - sec4)
gen sec_propone= sec1 / sec_ac
gen sec_proptwo= sec2 / sec_ac
gen sec_propthree = sec3 / sec_ac
gen sec_propfour = sec4 / sec_ac
*/
save "parcels.n.well", replace
////Add in the time-series component:
sort parcelid
expand 46
bysort parcelid cmpldyear: gen year = 1954 + _n
////Create the "death" variable
ge adopt = 0
replace adopt = 1 if year==cmpldyear-1
replace adopt = 2 if year>cmpldyear-1
drop if adopt==2
tsset parcelid year
sort sec_id parcelid year
btscs adopt year sec_id, gen(temp) failure
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drop temp _t* _frstfl
rename _prefail prefail
lab var prefail "\# prev. section wells"
sort parcelid year
save "parcels.n.well.est", replace
/*
////Merge the weather data
///Precipitation
use "parcels.n.well.est", clear
set more off
sort sec_id year
local i = 1955
while ‘i’ < 2001{
merge m:1 section town range year using ///
"~/Stata/Chase/Weather/ppt_‘i’.dta", ///
update nogenerate
sort sec_id year
local i = ‘i’ + 1
}
save "parcels.n.well.est", replace
///Beneficial Heat
use "parcels.n.well.est", clear
set more off
sort sec_id year
local i = 1955
while ‘i’ < 2001{
merge m:1 section town range year using ///
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"~/Stata/Chase/Weather/heat_yr_‘i’.dta", ///
update nogenerate
sort sec_id year
local i = ‘i’ + 1
}
save "parcels.n.well.est", replace
*/
*replace ppt = ppt/10 /* scaled to inches */
*replace ecount = round(ecount)
ge lnpwl=ln(sec_pwl)
ge lngpm=ln(sec_gpm)
drop if parcelid==.
sort parcelid year
save "parcels.n.well.est", replace
/*
collapse (first) section town range wellid cert_acres ///
latwell lonwell replacemen cmpldyear sec_pwl sec_gpm ///
pwl gpm parcelwells sec_id soilfour soilthree soiltwo ///
soilone acres adopt ppt ppt2 dd2 ecount2 dd edd ecount ///
, by(parcelid year)
*/
///Generate lagged variables
sort parcelid year
/*
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ge lagppt = (l.ppt + l2.ppt + l3.ppt + l4.ppt + ///
l5.ppt)/5 if year > 1959
ge lagdd = (l.dd + l2.dd + l3.dd + l4.dd + //
l5.dd )/5 if year > 1959
*ge ppt2MA5 = (l.ppt2 + l2.ppt2 + l3.ppt2 + l4.ppt2 ///
+ l5.ppt2)/5 if year > 1959
*ge ecount2MA5 = (l.ecount2 + l2.ecount2 + l3.ecount2 + ///
l4.ecount2 + l5.ecount2 )/5 if year > 1959
*ge dd2MA5 = (l.dd2 + l2.dd2 + l3.dd2 + l4.dd2 ///
+ l5.dd2 )/5 if year > 1959
ge lagcount = (l.ecount + l2.ecount + l3.ecount + l4.ecount ///
+ l5.ecount )/5 if year > 1959
ge lagedd = (l.edd + l2.edd + l3.edd + l4.edd ///
+ l5.edd )/5 if year > 1959
ge lnppt = ln(lagppt)
ge ppt2=lagppt*lagppt
ge lagcount2 = lagcount^2
*/
lab var sec_pwl "Depth"
lab var sec_gpm "Well Yield"
lab var lngpm "ln(Well Yield)"
lab var lnpwl "ln(Depth)"
ge pwl2 = sec_pwl*sec_pwl
ge gpm2 = sec_gpm*sec_gpm
*lab var lnacres "ln(Acres)"
/*lab var lntwo "ln(Soil Class 2)"
lab var lnthree "ln(Soil Class 3)"
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lab var lnfour "ln(Soil Class 4)"
*/
/*lab var lagdd "Beneficial Heat"
lab var lagppt "Precipitation"
lab var ppt2 "Precip sq"
lab var lagedd "Harmful Heat"
lab var lagcount "Days Harmful Heat"
lab var lagcount2 "Days Harmful Heat sq"
*/
drop if year < 1960
compress
save "parcels.n.well.est", replace
////Set up the survival variables
bysort parcelid: ge j = _n
lab var j "spell year"
ta j, ge(d)
lab var d1 "1960"
lab var d2 "1961"
lab var d3 "1962"
lab var d4 "1963"
lab var d5 "1964"
lab var d6 "1965"
lab var d7 "1966"
lab var d8 "1967"
lab var d9 "1968"
lab var d10 "1969"
lab var d11 "1970"
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lab var d12 "1971" /*End of gold standard */
lab var d13 "1972" /*Peruvian anchovy fail -> high soy P’s 73-74 */
lab var d14 "1973" /*1st Energy Crisis, */
lab var d15 "1974" /*Deficiency payment program */
lab var d16 "1975"
lab var d17 "1976"
lab var d18 "1977"
lab var d19 "1978"
lab var d20 "1979" /*Second Energy Crisis */
lab var d21 "1980"
lab var d22 "1981"
lab var d23 "1982"
lab var d24 "1983" /*PIK: Largest acreage reduction in history*/
lab var d25 "1984" /*End of Farm Credit Crisis,
Major revision of commodity support programs */
lab var d26 "1985"
lab var d27 "1986"
lab var d28 "1987"
lab var d29 "1988"
lab var d30 "1989"
lab var d31 "1990"
lab var d32 "1991"
lab var d33 "1992"
lab var d34 "1993"
lab var d35 "1994" /*Commodity Price Runup */
lab var d36 "1995" /*Corn, wheat peak */
lab var d37 "1996" /*Soybean peak */
lab var d38 "1997" /* Beginning of financial crisis */
lab var d39 "1998"
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lab var d40 "1999"
lab var d41 "2000"
/*lab var soilone "Soil class 1"
lab var soiltwo "Soil class 2"
lab var soilthree "Soil class 3"
lab var soilfour "Soil class 4"
lab var dsoil1 "Soil 1 Dummy"
lab var dsoil2 "Soil 2 Dummy"
lab var dsoil3 "Soil 3 Dummy"
lab var dsoil4 "Soil 4 Dummy"
*/
lab var propone "Soil class 1"
lab var proptwo "Soil class 2"
lab var propthree "Soil class 3"
lab var propfour "Soil class 4"
sort parcelid year
stset j, f(adopt == 1) id(parcelid)
save "parcels.n.well.est", replace
///Import dist-time bands
local i=1960
while ‘i’ < 2000{
clear all
set mem 5000m
set matsize 11000
set more off
insheet using "~/MATLAB/Chase/distance/ ///
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dist_not_‘i’.csv", names
local s=1
while ‘s’<11{
rename d‘s’ dist‘s’
local s = ‘s’ +1
}
merge 1:m sec_id year using "parcels.n.well.est", ///
nogenerate keep(2 3)
save "parcels.n.well.est", replace
local i = ‘i’ + 1
}
lab var dist2 "Prev. wells, 2 miles"
lab var dist3 "Prev. wells, 3 miles"
*mkspline jfit = j, cubic nknots(4)
*mkspline int1 7 int2 16 int3 20 int4 24 int5 = j
keep if (j>=1 & j<=33) | (j==39)
sort parcelid year
save "parcels.n.well.est", replace
B.8 Estimation
clear all
chdir ~/Documents/Stata/Chase/
set mem 5000m
set matsize 10000
set more off
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/*
//Created using est_rebuild_6_27_11.do
use "parcels.n.well.est"
//Doing this so that I don’t write over the first file
// with different data/
save "parcels.estimation", replace
**Also for graph-making
*/
//Comment out these first two commands . . .
use "parcels.estimation"
sort parcelid j
/*
gen index = 1*propone + 2*proptwo + 3*propthree + 4*propfour
gen index_sq = index^2
gen cc_index = 2*propone + 3*proptwo + 4*propthree + 4*propfour
gen cc_quad = cc_index^2
lab var index "Soil Quality Index"
lab var index_sq "Soil Quality Index, squared"
save "parcels.estimation", replace
*/
eststo _cloglog: qui cloglog adopt d1-d33 d39 dist3 ///
prefail acres proptwo propthree propfour lngpm lnpwl, ///
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nocons nolog
* Pseudo-R2 = 0.08735076
estimates save cloglog_7_13, replace
eststo _gamma: qui pgmhaz8 d1-d33 d39 dist3 ///
prefail acres proptwo propthree ///
propfour lngpm lnpwl, id(parcelid) dead(adopt) seq(j) ///
nocons nolog difficult
estimates save gamma_7_13, replace
* Pseudo-R2 = 0.11529293
eststo _normal: qui xtcloglog adopt d1-d33 d39 dist3 ///
prefail acres proptwo propthree propfour lngpm lnpwl, ///
nocons re difficult nolog
estimates save normal_7_13, replace
* Pseudo-R2 = 0.12141092
esttab _cloglog _gamma _normal using "~/Research/ ///
Dissertation/Main/regs_7_29_2011.tex", replace t(a2) ///
booktabs aic bic b(a3) eform ///
scalars(ll N) ///
page(dcolumn) label alignment(D{.}{.}{-1}) nodepvars ///
drop(d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 d11 d12 d13 d14 d15 ///
d16 d17 d18 d19 d20 d21 d22 d23 d24 d25 d26 d27 ///
d28 d29 d30 d31 d32 d33 d39)
esttab _cloglog _gamma _normal using "~/Research/ ///
Dissertation/Main/dummies_8_4_2011.tex", replace t(a2) ///
booktabs aic bic b(a3) eform ///
scalars(ll N) longtable ///
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page(dcolumn) label alignment(D{.}{.}{-1}) nodepvars ///
drop(dist3 prefail acres proptwo propthree ///
propfour lngpm lnpwl) ///
mtitles("Pooled" "Gamma Frailty" "Normal Frailty") nonumbers
*ll_0 gammav se_gammav ll_nofr lltest lltest_p rho p sigma_u
////Check proportional hazard assumption
eststo _logit: qui logit adopt d1-d33 d39 dist3 prefail ///
acres proptwo propthree propfour ///
lngpm lnpwl, nocons nolog
estimates save logit_7_29, replace
eststo _xtlogit: qui xtlogit adopt d1-d33 d39 dist3 prefail ///
acres proptwo propthree propfour lngpm lnpwl, ///
nocons re difficult nolog
estimates save xtlogit_7_13 , replace
////Check proportional hazard assumption
eststo _probit: qui probit adopt d1-d33 d39 dist3 prefail ///
acres proptwo propthree propfour lngpm lnpwl, ///
nocons nolog
estimates save probit_7_29, replace
eststo _xtprobit: qui xtprobit adopt d1-d33 d39 dist3 ///
prefail acres proptwo propthree propfour lngpm ///
lnpwl, nocons re difficult nolog
estimates save xtprobit_7_29, replace
esttab _normal _xtlogit _xtprobit using "~/Research/ ///
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Dissertation/Main/regs_link_7_29_2011.tex", replace t(a2) ///
booktabs aic bic b(a3) eform ///
scalars(ll rho p sigma_u N) ///
page(dcolumn) label alignment(D{.}{.}{-1}) ///
nodepvars drop(d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 ///
d11 d12 d13 d14 d15 d16 d17 d18 d19 d20 d21 d22 ///
d23 d24 d25 d26 d27 d28 d29 d30 d31 d32 d33 d39)
////Compare estimates using a linear soil index
estimates use normal_7_13
eststo _normal
eststo _linear: qui xtcloglog adopt d1-d33 d39 dist3 ///
prefail acres index lngpm lnpwl, nocons ///
re difficult nolog
estimates save linear_7_29
eststo _squared: qui xtcloglog adopt d1-d33 d39 dist3 ///
prefail acres index index_sq lngpm lnpwl, ///
nocons re difficult nolog
estimates save squared_7_29
esttab _normal _linear _squared using "~/Research/ ///
Dissertation/Main/regs_soil_7_29_2011.tex", ///
replace t(a2) booktabs aic bic b(a3) eform ///
scalars(ll rho p sigma_u N) ///
page(dcolumn) label alignment(D{.}{.}{-1}) ///
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nodepvars drop(d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 ///
d11 d12 d13 d14 d15 d16 d17 d18 d19 d20 d21 ///
d22 d23 d24 d25 d26 d27 d28 d29 d30 d31 d32 d33 d39)
B.9 Post estimation
* Graph the hazards
clear all
set mem 500m
set more off
use "parcels.estimation"
sort parcelid j
su lngpm if year==1960
local yield=r(mean)
replace lngpm=‘yield’
su lnpwl if year==1960
local depth=r(mean)
replace lnpwl=‘depth’
su acres if year==1960
local ac=r(mean)
replace acres=‘ac’
su proptwo if year==1960
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local two=r(mean)
replace proptwo=‘two’
su propthree if year==1960
local three=r(mean)
replace propthree=‘three’
su propfour if year==1960
local four=r(mean)
replace propfour=‘four’
est use normal_7_13
predict p, pu0
bysort parcelid (j): ge s = exp(sum(ln(1-p)))
egen s_normal = mean(s), by(year)
drop p s
est use cloglog_7_13
predict h, p
bysort parcelid (j): ge s = exp(sum(ln(1-h)))
egen s_pooled = mean(s), by(year)
drop h s
lab var s_pooled "Predicted S(t), Pooled Clog-log model"
lab var s_normal "Predicted S(t), RE Clog-log model"
graph twoway (line s_pooled j, sort clwidth(thick)) ///
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(line s_normal j, sort clwidth(thick)) , xtitle("Year") ///
ytitle("S(t)") legend(rows(2))
graph display, scheme(sj)
graph save surv_mean_7_13.jpg
drop s_pooled s_normal p s
***Compare baseline survival
replace acres=0
replace propfour=0
replace propthree=0
replace proptwo=0
replace lngpm=0
replace lnpwl=0
replace prefail=0
replace dist3=0
est use normal_7_13
predict p, pu0
bysort parcelid (j): ge s = exp(sum(ln(1-p)))
egen s_normal = mean(s), by(year)
drop p s
est use cloglog_7_13
predict h, p
bysort parcelid (j): ge s = exp(sum(ln(1-h)))
egen s_pooled = mean(s), by(year)
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drop h s
lab var s_pooled "Baseline S(t), Pooled Clog-log model"
lab var s_normal "Baseline S(t), RE Clog-log model"
graph twoway (line s_pooled j, sort clwidth(thick)) ///
(line s_normal j, sort clwidth(thick)) , xtitle("Year") ///
ytitle("S(t)") legend(rows(2))
graph display, scheme(sj)
graph save base_survs_7_18.jpg
*Estimate impact of hydrologic variability
clear all
set mem 500m
set more off
chdir ~/Documents/Stata/Chase/
* Use section-level summary statistics
use "sec_gw_data"
su sec_gpm
local ym=r(mean)
local ysd = r(sd)
scalar yield_m = ‘ym’
scalar yield_psd = ‘ym’ + ‘ysd’
scalar yield_msd = ‘ym’ - ‘ysd’
su sec_pwl
local pm=r(mean)
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local psd = r(sd)
scalar pump_m = ‘pm’
scalar pump_psd = ‘pm’ + ‘psd’
scalar pump_msd = ‘pm’ - ‘psd’
use "parcels.estimation", clear
sort parcelid j
est use normal_7_13
su proptwo if year==1960
local two=r(mean)
replace proptwo=‘two’
su propthree if year==1960
local three=r(mean)
replace propthree=‘three’
su propfour if year==1960
local four=r(mean)
replace propfour=‘four’
su acres if year==1960
local ac=r(mean)
replace acres=‘ac’
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/////Prediction for relatively high pumping costs
replace lnpwl= ln(pump_psd)
replace lngpm= ln(yield_msd)
predict p, pu0
bysort parcelid (j): ge s = exp(sum(ln(1-p)))
egen sh = mean(s), by(year)
drop p s
//////Prediction for average pumping costs
replace lnpwl= ln(pump_m)
replace lngpm= ln(yield_m)
predict p, pu0
bysort parcelid (j): ge s = exp(sum(ln(1-p)))
egen sm = mean(s), by(year)
drop p s
////Prediction for relatively low pumping costs
replace lnpwl= ln(pump_msd)
replace lngpm= ln(yield_psd)
predict p, pu0
bysort parcelid (j): ge s = exp(sum(ln(1-p)))
egen sl = mean(s), by(year)
drop p s
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lab var sh "Predicted S(t), low well yield, high pump lift"
lab var sm "Predicted S(t), mean well yield, pump lift "
lab var sl "Predicted S(t), high well yield, low pump lift"
graph twoway (line sh j, sort clwidth(thick)) ///
(line sm j, sort clwidth(thick)) ///
(line sl j, sort clwidth(thick)), xtitle("Year") ///
ytitle("S(t)") legend(rows(3))
graph display, scheme(sj)
graph save pumping_temp.jpg, replace
//Compare soil effects:
///1. Generate predictions based on parcels high quality soil,
/// at mean of other covariates
clear all
set mem 500m
set more off
chdir ~/Documents/Stata/Chase/
use "parcels.estimation"
sort parcelid j
est use normal_7_13
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su lngpm if year==1960
local yield=r(mean)
replace lngpm=‘yield’
su lnpwl if year==1960
local depth=r(mean)
replace lnpwl=‘depth’
su acres if year==1960
local ac=r(mean)
replace acres=‘ac’
su proptwo if year==1960
local two=r(mean)
replace proptwo=‘two’
su propthree if year==1960
local three=r(mean)
replace propthree=‘three’
su propfour if year==1960
local four=r(mean)
replace propfour=‘four’
replace proptwo=0
replace propthree=0
replace propfour=0
predict p, pu0
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bysort parcelid (j): ge s = exp(sum(ln(1-p)))
egen s1 = mean(s), by(year)
egen p1 = mean(p), by(year)
drop p s
replace proptwo=1
predict p, pu0
bysort parcelid (j): ge s = exp(sum(ln(1-p)))
egen s2 = mean(s), by(year)
egen p2 = mean(p), by(year)
drop p s
replace proptwo=0
replace propthree=1
predict p, pu0
bysort parcelid (j): ge s = exp(sum(ln(1-p)))
egen s3 = mean(s), by(year)
egen p3 = mean(p), by(year)
drop p s
replace propthree=0
replace propfour=1
predict p, pu0
bysort parcelid (j): ge s = exp(sum(ln(1-p)))
egen s4 = mean(s), by(year)
egen p4 = mean(p), by(year)
106
drop p s
lab var s1 "Predicted S(t), soil class 1"
lab var s2 "Predicted S(t), soil class 2"
lab var s3 "Predicted S(t), soil class 3"
lab var s4 "Predicted S(t), soil class 4"
/*
lab var s1 "Predicted {&lambda}(t), soil class 1"
lab var s2 "Predicted {&lambda}(t), soil class 2"
lab var s3 "Predicted {&lambda}(t), soil class 3"
lab var s4 "Predicted {&lambda}(t), soil class 4"
graph twoway (scatter p1 j, sort clwidth(thick)) ///
(scatter p2 j, sort clwidth(thick)) ///
(scatter p3 j, sort clwidth(thick)) ///
(scatter p4 j, sort clwidth(thick)), xtitle("Year") ///
ytitle("{&lambda}(t)") legend(cols(2))
graph display, scheme(sj)
*/
graph twoway (line s1 j, sort clwidth(thick)) ///
(line s2 j, sort clwidth(thick)) ///
(line s3 j, sort clwidth(thick)) ///
(line s4 j, sort clwidth(thick)), xtitle("Year") ///
ytitle("S(t)") legend(cols(2))
graph display, scheme(sj)
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graph save soils_7_18.jpg
B.10 Weather data
////This do file will take the raw weather station data
/// and put together 2 datasets:
/// 1. cumulative: precipitation, hundredths of inches
/// 2. monthly: precipitation, hundredths of inches
///The first part of the code assembles the weather
/// station data to get it ready for interpolation in Matlab.
////The second part of the code exports the data to Matlab.
/// The third part imports the interpolated data
/// that treats section id as the observation.
clear all
chdir ~/Documents/Stata/Chase/
set mem 500m
set more off
//////First import the counties in Nebraska:
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/ ///
WeatherStationData/Region/NEmonthlydat.txt", names
drop in 1
drop un
save "ppt.dta", replace
******Total Precipitation during Growing Season*****
keep if strmatch(elem, "TPCP")
destring coopid year mar apr may jun jul aug, replace
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mvdecode _all, mv(-99999)
sort coopid
keep elem coopid year mar apr may jun jul aug
save "ppt", replace
////Import and merge the counties in Colorado:
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/ ///
WeatherStationData/Region/COmonthlydat.txt", ///
names clear
drop in 1
drop un
///save "ppt.dta", replace
******Total Precipitation during Growing Season*****
keep if strmatch(elem, "TPCP")
destring coopid year mar apr may jun jul aug, replace
mvdecode _all, mv(-99999)
sort coopid
keep elem coopid year mar apr may jun jul aug
append using "ppt"
save "ppt", replace
impute mar apr may jun jul aug, gen(i_mar)
impute apr mar may jun jul aug, gen(i_apr)
impute may mar apr jun jul aug, gen(i_may)
impute jun mar apr may jul aug, gen(i_jun)
impute jul mar apr may jun aug, gen(i_jul)
impute aug mar apr may jun jul, gen(i_aug)
replace mar=i_mar
replace apr=i_apr
replace may=i_may
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replace jun=i_jun
replace jul=i_jul
replace aug=i_aug
drop i_*
save "ppt", replace
sort coopid year
by coopid year: gen ppt=mar+apr
by coopid year: replace ppt=ppt+may
by coopid year: replace ppt=ppt+jun
by coopid year: replace ppt=ppt+jul
by coopid year: replace ppt=ppt+aug
save "ppt", replace
*******Merge station coordinates************
////Import station coordinates:
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/ ///
WeatherStationData/Region/COmonthlystn.txt", ///
clear names
set more off
save "pptstns", replace
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/ ///
WeatherStationData/Region/NEmonthlystn.txt", ///
clear names
set more off
append using "pptstns"
///Delete any duplicates
duplicates drop coopid, force
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save "pptstns", replace
merge 1:m coopid using "ppt", nogenerate keep(3)
drop if ppt==.
sort coopid
save "ppt", replace
******Outsheet data for interpolation********
*mkdir "~/Matlab/Weather/ppt/"
local i=1955
while ‘i’<=2000{
clear
set more off
use "ppt"
keep if year == ‘i’
sort longitude latitude
outsheet longitude latitude ppt mar apr may jun jul aug using ///
"~/Documents/Matlab/Chase/weather/ppt_‘i’.txt", comma replace
local i = ‘i’ + 1
}
******Time to import precipitation at the section level*********
local i=1955
while ‘i’<=2000{
clear
set more off
insheet sec_id section town range ppt ppt_3 ///
ppt_4 ppt_5 ppt_6 ppt_7 ppt_8 ///
using "Weather/ppt_‘i’.txt"
gen year=‘i’
keep sec_id section town range year ppt
save "Weather/ppt_‘i’", replace
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local i = ‘i’ + 1
}
////This do file will take the raw weather station data and
/// put together 2 datasets:
/// 1. cumulative:
/// 2. monthly:
// 1. growing season beneficial deg days
///2. growing season harmful deg days
///3. growing season number of days > 29 deg Celcius
///The first part of the code assembles the weather station data
///to get it ready for interpolation in Matlab.
////The second part of the code exports the data to Matlab.
/// The third part imports the interpolated data that treats
/// section id as the observation.
clear all
set mem 1000m
chdir ~/Documents/Stata/Chase/
set more off
////First do the counties in Nebraska:
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/ ///
WeatherStationData/Region/NEdailydat.txt", ///
names
drop in 1
drop un
save "minmax", replace
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/ ///
WeatherStationData/Region/COdailydat.txt", ///
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names clear
set more off
drop in 1
drop un
append using "minmax"
save "minmax", replace
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/ ///
WeatherStationData/Region/KSdailydat.txt", ///
names clear
set more off
drop in 1
drop un
append using "minmax"
save "minmax", replace
******Maximum Temperature in Whole Degrees Fahrenheit*****
keep if strmatch(elem, "TMAX")
destring coopid yearmo day01-day31, replace
mvdecode _all, mv(-99999)
sort coopid yearmo
keep elem yearmo coopid day01 day02 day03 day04 day05 ///
day06 day07 day08 day09 day10 day11 day12 day13 ///
day14 day15 day16 day17 day18 day19 day20 day21 day22 ///
day23 day24 day25 day26 day27 day28 day29 day30 day31
drop if coopid>300000
local i=01
while ‘i’ <=9{
gen max‘i’=day0‘i’
replace max‘i’=(max‘i’ - 32)/1.8
*replace max‘i’=0 if max‘i’<=8
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local i = ‘i’ + 1
}
local i=10
while ‘i’ <=31{
gen max‘i’=day‘i’
replace max‘i’=(max‘i’ - 32)/1.8
*replace max‘i’=0 if max‘i’<=8
local i = ‘i’ + 1
}
save "minmaxedit", replace
clear
set more off
******Minimum Temperature in Whole Degrees Fahrenheit*****
use "minmax",
keep if strmatch(elem, "TMIN")
destring coopid yearmo day01-day31, replace
mvdecode _all, mv(-99999)
sort coopid yearmo
keep elem yearmo coopid day01 day02 day03 day04 day05 ///
day06 day07 day08 day09 day10 day11 day12 day13 day14 ///
day15 day16 day17 day18 day19 day20 day21 day22 day23 ///
day24 day25 day26 day27 day28 day29 day30 day31
drop if coopid>300000
local i=01
while ‘i’ <=9{
gen min‘i’=day0‘i’
replace min‘i’=(min‘i’ - 32)/1.8
*replace min‘i’=0 if min‘i’<=8
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local i = ‘i’ + 1
}
local i=10
while ‘i’ <=31{
gen min‘i’=day‘i’
replace min‘i’=(min‘i’ - 32)/1.8
*replace min‘i’=0 if min‘i’<=8
local i = ‘i’ + 1
}
duplicates drop coopid yearmo elem, force
merge 1:m coopid yearmo using "minmaxedit", nogenerate
drop day01-day31 elem
save "minmax", replace
//Fixed the yearmo variable in excel//
//Don’t need for cum. growing season deg days//
clear all
set more off
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/ ///
WeatherStationData/Region/NEdailyyearmo.txt"
drop if coopid>300000
duplicates drop yearmo coopid, force
merge 1:m coopid yearmo using "minmax", nogenerate keep(2 3)
save "minmaxedit", replace
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/ ///
WeatherStationData/Region/COdailyyearmo.txt", clear
set more off
drop if coopid>300000
duplicates drop yearmo coopid, force
merge 1:m coopid yearmo using "minmaxedit", nogenerate keep(2 3)
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save "minmaxedit", replace
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/ ///
WeatherStationData/Region/KSdailyyearmo.txt", clear
set more off
drop if coopid>300000
duplicates drop yearmo coopid, force
merge 1:m coopid yearmo using "minmaxedit", nogenerate keep(2 3)
save "minmaxedit", replace
save "minmax", replace
bysort coopid year mo: drop if (mo<3) | (mo>8)
sort coopid year mo
/*
reshape wide min1_-max31_, i(coopid year) j(mo)
////Remember that march, may, july, and august have 31 days
drop min31_4 min31_6 max31_4 max31_6
*/
impute min1 min2-min31, gen(i_min1)
impute min2 min1 min3-min31, gen(i_min2)
impute min3 min1-min2 min4-min31, gen(i_min3)
impute min4 min1-min3 min5-min31, gen(i_min4)
impute min5 min1-min4 min6-min31, gen(i_min5)
impute min6 min1-min5 min7-min31, gen(i_min6)
impute min7 min1-min6 min8-min31, gen(i_min7)
impute min8 min1-min7 min9-min31, gen(i_min8)
impute min9 min1-min8 min10-min31, gen(i_min9)
impute min10 min1-min9 min11-min31, gen(i_min10)
impute min11 min1-min10 min12-min31, gen(i_min11)
impute min12 min1-min11 min13-min31, gen(i_min12)
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impute min13 min1-min12 min14-min31, gen(i_min13)
impute min14 min1-min13 min15-min31, gen(i_min14)
impute min15 min1-min14 min16-min31, gen(i_min15)
impute min16 min1-min15 min17-min31, gen(i_min16)
impute min17 min1-min16 min18-min31, gen(i_min17)
impute min18 min1-min17 min19-min31, gen(i_min18)
impute min19 min1-min18 min20-min31, gen(i_min19)
impute min20 min1-min19 min21-min31, gen(i_min20)
impute min21 min1-min20 min22-min31, gen(i_min21)
impute min22 min1-min21 min23-min31, gen(i_min22)
impute min23 min1-min22 min24-min31, gen(i_min23)
impute min24 min1-min23 min25-min31, gen(i_min24)
impute min25 min1-min24 min26-min31, gen(i_min25)
impute min26 min1-min25 min27-min31, gen(i_min26)
impute min27 min1-min26 min28-min31, gen(i_min27)
impute min28 min1-min27 min29-min31, gen(i_min28)
impute min29 min1-min28 min30-min31, gen(i_min29)
impute min30 min1-min29 min31, gen(i_min30)
impute min31 min1-min30 if (mo != 4 & mo !=6), gen(i_min31)
impute max1 max2-max31, gen(i_max1)
impute max2 max1 max3-max31, gen(i_max2)
impute max3 max1-max2 max4-max31, gen(i_max3)
impute max4 max1-max3 max5-max31, gen(i_max4)
impute max5 max1-max4 max6-max31, gen(i_max5)
impute max6 max1-max5 max7-max31, gen(i_max6)
impute max7 max1-max6 max8-max31, gen(i_max7)
impute max8 max1-max7 max9-max31, gen(i_max8)
impute max9 max1-max8 max10-max31, gen(i_max9)
impute max10 max1-max9 max11-max31, gen(i_max10)
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impute max11 max1-max10 max12-max31, gen(i_max11)
impute max12 max1-max11 max13-max31, gen(i_max12)
impute max13 max1-max12 max14-max31, gen(i_max13)
impute max14 max1-max13 max15-max31, gen(i_max14)
impute max15 max1-max14 max16-max31, gen(i_max15)
impute max16 max1-max15 max17-max31, gen(i_max16)
impute max17 max1-max16 max18-max31, gen(i_max17)
impute max18 max1-max17 max19-max31, gen(i_max18)
impute max19 max1-max18 max20-max31, gen(i_max19)
impute max20 max1-max19 max21-max31, gen(i_max20)
impute max21 max1-max20 max22-max31, gen(i_max21)
impute max22 max1-max21 max23-max31, gen(i_max22)
impute max23 max1-max22 max24-max31, gen(i_max23)
impute max24 max1-max23 max25-max31, gen(i_max24)
impute max25 max1-max24 max26-max31, gen(i_max25)
impute max26 max1-max25 max27-max31, gen(i_max26)
impute max27 max1-max26 max28-max31, gen(i_max27)
impute max28 max1-max27 max29-max31, gen(i_max28)
impute max29 max1-max28 max30-max31, gen(i_max29)
impute max30 max1-max29 max31, gen(i_max30)
impute max31 max1-max30 if (mo != 4 & mo !=6), gen(i_max31)
local i=1
while ‘i’<=31{
replace min‘i’=i_min‘i’
replace max‘i’=i_max‘i’
drop i_min‘i’ i_max‘i’
local i=‘i’+1
}
*/
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save "minmax", replace
///Calc # needed for Snyder method for estimating///
///cumulative degree days
local i=1
while ‘i’ <= 31{
gen m‘i’=(max‘i’+min‘i’)/2
gen w‘i’=(max‘i’-min‘i’)/2
gen phi‘i’=asin((29-m‘i’)/w‘i’)
gen theta‘i’=asin((8-m‘i’)/w‘i’)
local i = ‘i’ + 1
}
local i=1
while ‘i’<=31{
gen DDl‘i’=m‘i’-8 if theta‘i’==.
replace DDl‘i’=w‘i’*theta‘i’ if theta‘i’!=.
gen DDu‘i’=m‘i’-29 if phi‘i’==.
replace DDu‘i’=w‘i’*phi‘i’ if theta‘i’!=.
replace DDu‘i’=0 if DDu‘i’==.
replace DDu‘i’=0 if DDu‘i’<0
replace DDl‘i’=0 if DDl‘i’<0
local i=‘i’+1
}
local i=1
while ‘i’<=31{
gen DD‘i’=DDl‘i’-DDu‘i’
replace DD‘i’=0 if DD‘i’<0
local i=‘i’+1
}
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save "minmax", replace
////Remove incomplete years:
bysort coopid year: egen motemp=sum(mo)
drop if motemp < 33
drop motemp
save "minmax", replace
*******Sum Degree Days over month**************
bysort year mo: gen moDD=DD1 + DD2
local i=3
while ‘i’<=31{
replace moDD=moDD + DD‘i’
local i=‘i’+1
}
save "minmax", replace
keep if mo >= 3 & mo <= 8
bysort coopid year: gen cumDD=sum(moDD)
collapse (first) year-cumDD, by(coopid yearmo)
//keep if mo==8
*keep cumDD coopid year
******Count number of extreme days***********
local i=1
while ‘i’<=31{
ge DDe‘i’=round(DDu‘i’)
replace DDe‘i’=. if DDe‘i’==0
local i=‘i’+1
}
egen dte=rownonmiss(DDe1-DDe31)
sort coopid year mo
bysort coopid year: gen cumDE=sum(dte)
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save "minmaxedit", replace
******Sum extreme degree days*************
bysort year mo: gen moDDu=DDu1 + DDu2
local i=3
while ‘i’<=31{
replace moDDu=moDDu + DDu‘i’
local i=‘i’+1
}
sort coopid year mo
by coopid year: gen cumDDex=sum(moDDu)
save "minmaxedit", replace
******First doing yearly data********
keep if mo==8
keep coopid year cumDD cumDDex cumDE
save "heat_yrly", replace
*******Merge station coordinates************
****Import the weather station data*******
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/ ///
WeatherStationData/Region/COdailystn.txt", ///
clear names double
set more off
save "station_coords", replace
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/ ///
WeatherStationData/Region/NEdailystn.txt", ///
clear names double
set more off
append using "station_coords"
save "station_coords", replace
insheet using "~/Documents/Research/ ///
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WeatherStationData/Region/KSdailystn.txt", ///
clear names double
set more off
append using "station_coords"
save "station_coords", replace
use "heat_yrly", clear
merge m:m coopid using "station_coords", nogenerate keep(3)
save "heat_yrly", replace
/////Now I’m getting the monthly data ready for export:
use "minmaxedit", clear
set more off
keep coopid year mo dte moDDu moDD
rename moDDu eDD
rename moDD DD
reshape wide DD dte eDD, i(coopid year) j(mo)
merge m:m coopid using "station_coords", nogenerate keep(3)
save "heat_monthly", replace
******Outsheet data for interpolation********
*mkdir "~/Matlab/Weather/heat/"
local i=1955
while ‘i’<=2000{
clear
set more off
use "heat_yrly"
keep if year == ‘i’
sort longitude latitude
outsheet coopid longitude latitude cumDD cumDDex cumDE ///
using "~/Documents/MATLAB/Chase/weather/ ///
heat_yr_‘i’.txt", comma replace
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local i = ‘i’ + 1
}
local i=1955
while ‘i’<=2000{
clear
set more off
use "heat_monthly"
keep if year == ‘i’
sort longitude latitude
outsheet coopid longitude latitude DD3 DD4 DD5 DD6 ///
DD7 DD8 using "~/Documents/MATLAB/Chase/weather/ ///
degdays_mo_‘i’.txt", comma replace
outsheet coopid longitude latitude eDD3 eDD4 eDD5 ///
eDD6 eDD7 eDD8 using "~/Documents/MATLAB/Chase/ ///
weather/extdays_mo_‘i’.txt", comma replace
outsheet coopid longitude latitude dte3 dte4 dte5 ///
dte6 dte7 dte8 using "~/Documents/MATLAB/Chase/ ///
weather/extcount_mo_‘i’.txt", comma replace
local i = ‘i’ + 1
}
******Import the data**********
local i=1955
while ‘i’<=2000{
clear
set more off
insheet sec_id section town range dd edd ecount using ///
"Weather/heat_yr_‘i’.txt"
gen year=‘i’
save "Weather/heat_yr_‘i’", replace
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local i = ‘i’ + 1
}
clear
% Now import the well data from stata
fid=fopen(’ /Documents/MATLAB/Chase/sec ids.txt’);
c = textscan(fid,...
’%f %f %f %f %f %f’,...
’delimiter’, ’,’,’HeaderLines’,1);
fclose(fid);
secID = c{1};
section = c{2};
town = c{3};
range = c{4};
qy = c{6};
qx = c{5};
% set up output matrix
%depth = zeros(size(c{1},1),1);
for i=1:45
s = [’ /Matlab/Weather/ppt ’ int2str(i+1955) ’.txt’];
fid = feval(@fopen,s);
p = textscan(fid,...
’%f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f’,...
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’delimiter’, ’,’,’HeaderLines’,1);
fclose(fid);
% Define the variables
x = p{1};
y = p{2};
ppt = p{3};
apr = p{4};
may = p{5};
jun = p{6};
jul = p{7};
aug = p{8};
X = [x y];
Fyr = TriScatteredInterp(X,ppt,’natural’);
Fapr = TriScatteredInterp(X,apr,’natural’);
Fmay = TriScatteredInterp(X,may,’natural’);
Fjun = TriScatteredInterp(X,jun,’natural’);
Fjul = TriScatteredInterp(X,jul,’natural’);
Faug = TriScatteredInterp(X,aug,’natural’);
% Create a grid of precipitation values
%[qx qy] = meshgrid(-102.05:.001:-101,40.3:.001:40.7);
qz yr = Fyr(qx,qy);
qz apr = Fapr(qx,qy);
qz may = Fmay(qx,qy);
qz jun = Fjun(qx,qy);
qz jul = Fjul(qx,qy);
qz aug = Faug(qx,qy);
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% Interpolation
%depth(:,1) = interp2(qx,qy,qz1,seclon,seclat,’cubic’);
csvwrite(’ /data/Mil/sec gw interps.csv’,[secID section town range qz1 qz2]);
end
clear
% Now import the well data from stata
fid=fopen(’ /Documents/MATLAB/Chase/sec ids.txt’);
c = textscan(fid,...
’%f %f %f %f %f %f’,...
’delimiter’, ’,’,’HeaderLines’,1);
fclose(fid);
secID = c{1};
section = c{2};
town = c{3};
range = c{4};
lat = c{6};
lon = c{5};
qx = lon;
qy = lat;
%[qx,qy] = meshgrid(-102.5:0.001:-101.3,40.25:0.0001:40.7);
% set up output matrix
%heat = zeros(size(c{1},1),6);
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for i=1:46
s = [’ /Documents/MATLAB/Chase/weather/heat yr ’ ...
int2str(i+1954) ’.txt’];
fid = feval(@fopen,s);
p = textscan(fid,...
’%f %f %f %f %f %f ’,...
’delimiter’, ’,’,’HeaderLines’,1);
fclose(fid);
% Define the variables
x = p{2};
y = p{3};
cumDD = p{4};
cumDDex = p{5};
cumDE = p{6};
X = [x y];
Fheat = TriScatteredInterp(X,cumDD,’natural’);
Fext = TriScatteredInterp(X,cumDDex,’natural’);
Fdays = TriScatteredInterp(X,cumDE,’natural’);
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% Create a grid of precipitation values
%[qx qy] = meshgrid(-102.05:.001:-101,40.3:.001:40.7);
qz heat = Fheat(qx,qy);
qz ext = Fext(qx,qy);
qz days = Fdays(qx,qy);
outputmat=zeros(size(qx,1),7);
outputmat=[secID section town range qz heat qz ext qz days];
eval([’dlmwrite(’’ /Documents/Stata/Chase/Weather/heat yr ’ int2str(i+1954) ’.txt’’ ,
outputmat,”precision”,10);’])
end
clear
% Now import the well data from stata
fid=fopen(’ /Documents/MATLAB/Chase/sec ids.txt’);
c = textscan(fid,...
’%f %f %f %f %f %f’,...
’delimiter’, ’,’,’HeaderLines’,1);
fclose(fid);
secID = c{1};
section = c{2};
town = c{3};
range = c{4};
qy = c{6};
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qx = c{5};
% set up output matrix
%heat = zeros(size(c{1},1),6);
for i=1:46
s = [’ /Documents/MATLAB/Chase/weather/extdays mo ’ ...
int2str(i+1954) ’.txt’];
fid = feval(@fopen,s);
p = textscan(fid,...
’%f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f %f’,...
’delimiter’, ’,’,’HeaderLines’,1);
fclose(fid);
% Define the variables
x = p{2};
y = p{3};
mar = p{4};
apr = p{5};
may = p{6};
jun = p{7};
jul = p{8};
aug = p{9};
X = [x y];
Fmar = TriScatteredInterp(X,mar,’natural’);
Fapr = TriScatteredInterp(X,apr,’natural’);
Fmay = TriScatteredInterp(X,may,’natural’);
Fjun = TriScatteredInterp(X,jun,’natural’);
Fjul = TriScatteredInterp(X,jul,’natural’);
Faug = TriScatteredInterp(X,aug,’natural’);
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% Create a grid of precipitation values
%[qx qy] = meshgrid(-102.05:.001:-101,40.3:.001:40.7);
qz mar = Fmar(qx,qy);
qz apr = Fapr(qx,qy);
qz may = Fmay(qx,qy);
qz jun = Fjun(qx,qy);
qz jul = Fjul(qx,qy);
qz aug = Faug(qx,qy);
date=i+1954;
outputmat=zeros(size(qx,1),10);
outputmat=[secID section town range qz mar qz apr qz may ...
qz jun qz jul qz aug];
eval([’csvwrite(’’ /Documents/Stata/Chase/Weather/extdays mo ’ int2str(i+1954)
’.csv’’,outputmat);’])
end
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Appendix C
Code for Chapter 3
C.1 Load MODFLOW input files
% code to read in RRB recharge data
%6-17-2010 Nick Brozovic
%format is 326*165
rcp 1994=zeros(326,165);
fid=fopen(’1994.rcp’);
for i=1:165
rcp 1994(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’ ’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
%%%%%%%%%
rcp 1995=zeros(326,165);
fid=fopen(’1995.rcp’);
for i=1:165
rcp 1995(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’ ’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
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%%%%%%%%%%
rcp 1996=zeros(326,165);
fid=fopen(’1996.rcp’);
for i=1:165
rcp 1996(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’ ’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
rcp 1997=zeros(326,165);
fid=fopen(’1997.rcp’);
for i=1:165
rcp 1997(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’ ’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
rcp 1998=zeros(326,165);
fid=fopen(’1998.rcp’);
for i=1:165
rcp 1998(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’ ’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.09.rcg’);
rcg 1998.sep = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
rcg 1998.sep(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
%surf(rcg 1998.sep),view(90,90)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.08.rcg’);
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rcg 1998.aug = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
rcg 1998.aug(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
%surf(rcg 1998.aug),view(90,90)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.07.rcg’);
rcg 1998.jul = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
rcs 1998.jul(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.06.rcg’);
rcg 1998.jun = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
rcg 1998.jun(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.08.rcg’);
rcg 1998.sep = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
rcg 1998.sep(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
surf(rcg 1998.sep),view(90,90)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Acres of groundwater
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.agw’);
agw 1998 = zeros(326,165);
133
for i=1:165
agw 1998(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
surf(agw 1998),view(90,90)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%
% Surface water recharge
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.09.rcs’);
rcs 1998.sep = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
rcs 1998.sep(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
%surf(rcs 1998.sep),view(90,90)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.08.rcs’);
rcs 1998.aug = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
rcs 1998.aug(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
%surf(rcs 1998.aug),view(90,90)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.07.rcs’);
rcs 1998.jul = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
rcs 1998.jul(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.06.rcs’);
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rcs 1998.jun = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
rcs 1998.jun(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.08.rcs’);
rcs 1998.sep = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
rcs 1998.sep(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
surf(rcs 1998.sep),view(90,90)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Don’t know this one - small reservoirs or fudge factor?
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.mi’);
mi 1998 = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
mi 1998(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
surf(mi 1998),view(90,90)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.07.rcc’);
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rcc 1998.jul = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
rcc 1998.jul(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
surf(rcc 1998.jul),view(90,90)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
fid=fopen(’../ne12b/1998.01.rcc’);
rcc 1998.jan = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
rcc 1998.jan(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
surf(rcc 1998.jan),view(90,90)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%
% Calculate transmissivity as conductivity * saturated thickness
%%%%%%%%%%%%
%conductivity
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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fid=fopen(’../12p.k’);
p.k = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
p.k(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
surf(p.k),view(90,90)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% sat thickness = top-bottom
fid=fopen(’../12.top’);
top = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
top(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
end
fclose(fid);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
fid=fopen(’../12.bot’);
bot = zeros(326,165);
for i=1:165
bot(:,i)=cell2mat(textscan(fid,’%f’, 326, ’delimiter’, ’\n’,’MultipleDelimsAsOne’, 1));
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end
fclose(fid);
surf(top-bot),view(90,90)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%define transmissivity
p.t=(top-bot).*p.k;
C.2 Generate pumping variables
%Find the externality they impose on their neighbors and
%Find the externality their neighbors impose on them.
clear wells
load ’base wells.mat’;
wellid=double(wells(:,1));
%owner=double(wells(:,2));
lon=double(wells(:,3));
lat=double(wells(:,4));
%row=double(wells(:,5));
%column=double(wells(:,6));
ac=double(wells(:,8));
u m=double(wells(:,9));
trans=double(wells(:,10));
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thick=double(wells(:,11));
%ppt=double(wells(:,12));
S=double(0.175);
%ppt=double(wells(:,13));
clear wells
% load dummies
% d21=dummies(:,1);
% d22=dummies(:,2);
% d23=dummies(:,3);
% d24=dummies(:,4);
% clear dummies
conversion=double(362.2/7.48);
feet=double(3.2808399);
well=double(ac.*u m*conversion);
% clear dist bands
dist=double(6*5280);
startday=213;
yr=365;
time=75;
stopday=startday - time;
%S=0.175;
%T=10000;
% load ’acreage.mat’
% twoprop=acreage(:,21)./(pi*4*640);
load ’b’;
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n=length(b);
m=length(wellid);
%To convert u* to correct units: 1 ac-in/yr = cubic feet/day
%223 gallons/day for four month pumping.
% 75 day pumping=362.2
%y=zeros(n,1);
own draw=zeros(m,1);
neigh draw=zeros(m,1);
for i=1:m
test=zeros(m,1);
test=vdist(lat(i)*ones(m,1),lon(i)*ones(m,1),lat,lon)*feet;
wells=zeros(size(test(test<=dist),1),2);
wells=sortrows([test(test<=dist) double(well(test<=dist))]);
T=double(trans(i));
myopic=double(well(i));
well dist=wells(:,1);
own draw(i)=wells(:,2)’*D;
neigh draw(i)=(ones(1,size(wells,1)).*myopic)*D;
end
x=zeros(n,4);
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for k=1:n
%drawdown=b(k,5)-b(k,4);
%trial for one well
test=zeros(m,1);
test=vdist(b(k,2)*ones(m,1),b(k,3)*ones(m,1),lat,lon )*feet ;
%T=trans(k);
%pull out only wells that are less than ’distance’ miles,
wells=zeros(size(test(test<=dist),1),4);
% (1)dist (2)myopic pumping
% (3)T
wells=sortrows([test(test<=dist) double(well(test<=dist)) double(own draw(test<=dist))
...
double(neigh draw(test<=dist)) double(trans(test<=dist))]);
well dist=wells(:,1);
T=wells(1,5);
D=(expint( (S*well dist.^2)/(4*T*startday) )./(4*pi*T)) ...
- (expint( (S*well dist.^2)/(4*T*stopday) )./(4*pi*T))+...
(expint( (S*well dist.^2)/(4*T*(startday + yr)) )./(4*pi*T)) - ...
(expint( (S*well dist.^2)/(4*T*(stopday + yr)) )./(4*pi*T))+...
(expint( (S*well dist.^2)/(4*T*(startday + yr*2)) )./(4*pi*T)) - ...
(expint( (S*well dist.^2)/(4*T*(stopday + yr*2)) )./(4*pi*T))+...
(expint( (S*well dist.^2)/(4*T*(startday + yr*3)) )./(4*pi*T)) - ...
(expint( (S*well dist.^2)/(4*T*(stopday + yr*3)) )./(4*pi*T));
%x1=pumping x2=num neighbors x3=herfindahl x4=mean dist 12 nearest neighbors
%x5=var dist 12 nearest neighbors x6=obs transmissivity
x(k,1)=wells(:,2)’*D;
x(k,2)=mean(wells(:,3));
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x(k,3)=mean(wells(:,4));
x(k,4)=wells(1,5);
%y(k)=b(k,5)-b(k,4)+wells(1,6);
end
%eval([’save(”y ’ int2str(alpha) ’.mat” , ”y” );’]);
%eval([’save(”x ’ int2str(alpha) ’.mat” , ”x” );’]);
save(’pump vars 6.mat’,’x’)
C.3 Calculate spatial concentration indices
clear wells
load ’base wells.mat’;
wellid=double(wells(:,1));
owner=double(wells(:,2));
lon=double(wells(:,3));
lat=double(wells(:,4));
%row=double(wells(:,5));
%column=double(wells(:,6));
ac=double(wells(:,8));
%u m=double(wells(:,9));
%trans=double(wells(:,10));
%recharge=double(wells(:,11));
%rech no gw=double(wells(:,12));
%S=double(0.175);
%ppt=double(wells(:,13));
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clear wells
load ’b.mat’;
% %Define the well function.
% startday=213;
% yr=365;
% time=75;
% stopday=startday - time;
% %conversion from ac/in per year to ft^3/day
% conversion=362.2/7.48;
feet=double(3.2808399);
dist=double(4*5280);
n=length(wellid);
m=length(b);
herfindahl=zeros(m,5);
%gini=zeros(m,1);
%herfindahl2=zeros(n,1);
for k=1:m
test=zeros(n,1);
test=vdist(b(k,2)*ones(n,1), ...
b(k,3)*ones(n,1),lat,lon)*feet;
acres=sortrows([test(test<=dist) double(ac(test<=dist)) ...
double(owner(test<=dist)) double(wellid(test<=dist))]);
herf=zeros(size(acres,1),1);
n herf=zeros(size(acres,1),1);
for i=1:size(acres,1)
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%find unique owner ids
uniq owners=unique(acres(1:i,3));
%find cumulative acreage for each owner
owner acres=zeros(size(uniq owners,1),1);
for j=1:size(uniq owners,1)
owner acres(j)=sum(acres((acres(1:i,3)==uniq owners(j)),2));
end
%generate Gini Coefficient
% G=1/(2n^2ybar)[sum i sum j—y i - y j—]
% generate NC=G/Gmax
% Gmax = 1 - (2/n)
%generate Herfindahl index
%N=length(uniq owners);
herf(i)=sum((owner acres/sum(acres(1:i,2))).^2);
herfindahl(k,3)=size(uniq owners,1);
n herf(i)=(herf(i)-1/herfindahl(k,3))/(1-1/herfindahl(k,3));
herfindahl(k,2)=n herf(i);
herfindahl(k,1)=wellid(k);
herfindahl(k,3)=size(uniq owners,1);
end
herfindahl(k,4)=size(acres,1);
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N=length(owner acres);
p=ones(N,1);
herfindahl(k,5)=GiniCoeff(p,owner acres);
%herfindahl(k,6)=herfindahl(k,5)/(1-(2/N));
%herfindahl(k,7)=TheilTIneq(owner acres);
end
for i=1:m
if isnan(herfindahl(i,2))==1
herfindahl(i,2)=1;
end
if isnan(herfindahl(i,5))==1
herfindahl(i,5)=1;
end
end
%No problem with NaNs, so no need to interpolate the data.
save(’obs herf 4.mat’,’herfindahl’);
%eval([’save(”herf ’ int2str(distance) ’.mat”,”herfindahl”);’])
C.4 Perform spatial regressions
%3/24/2011
% 1. Run herf8 10.m, changing dist and the filename to the desired
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% distance band.
% 2. Run pump vars3 17 11.m, changing dist and the filename.
% 3. Run this. Change which files are loaded though.
%Transfer function weighted variables:
% 1. Myopic pumping
% 2. Spatial herfindahl
% 3. number neighbors
% 4. Neighbors’ pumping
%Observation well variables
% 1. Transmissivity
% 2. Proportion of irrigated acreage
% 3. Net drawdown
% 4. Precipitation recharge
%Put together the variables.
%pumping well variables
% (1)myopic pumping (2)neighboing wells (3)neighboring owners
% (4)saturated thickness (5)pump herf (6)T
clear all
load pump vars 6
myopic=double(x(:,1));
ext own=double(x(:,2));
ext neigh=double(x(:,3));
%pump herf=double(x(:,5));
% d21=x(:,7); %Upper
% d22=x(:,8); %Middle
% d23=x(:,9); %Lower
% d24=x(:,10); %Tri
%Observation well variables
%thick=double(x(:,4));
T=double(x(:,4));
%lnT=log(T);
%lnthick=log(thick);
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clear x
load obs herf 6
herf=double(herfindahl(:,2));
%herf2=herf.^2;
no=double(herfindahl(:,3));
nw=double(herfindahl(:,4));
gini=double(herfindahl(:,5));
%nc=double(herfindahl(:,6));
%nw2=nw.^2;
%log nw=log(nw);
clear herfindahl
load acreage
% prop half=double(acreage(:,2)./(640*.25*pi));
% prop one=double(acreage(:,3)./(640*pi));
% prop onehalf=double(acreage(:,4)./(640*2.25*pi));
% prop two=double(acreage(:,5)./(640*4*pi));
% prop three=double(acreage(:,7)./(640*9*pi));
% prop four=double(acreage(:,9)./(640*9*pi));
% prop five=double(acreage(:,11)./(640*9*pi));
prop six=double(acreage(:,13)./(640*36*pi));
clear acreage
load y
load lon
load lat
T=T(nw>1);
prop six=prop six(nw>1);
lon=lon(nw>1);
lat=lat(nw>1);
y=y(nw>1);
myopic=myopic(nw>1);
herf=herf(nw>1);
%herf2=herf2(nw>1);
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gini=gini(nw>1);
no=no(nw>1);
nw=nw(nw>1);
ext own=ext own(nw>1);
ext neigh=ext neigh(nw>1);
% load neighbor
% onfarm=double(externalities(:,1));
% offfarm=double(externalities(:,2));
% ext=double(externalities(:,3));
% clear externalities
n=length(y);
feet=3.2808399;
w=zeros(n,n);
W=zeros(n,n);
for i=1:n;
w(:,i)=vdist(lat(i,1)*ones(1,n),lon(i,1)*ones(1,n),lat(:,1)’,lon(:,1)’)*feet./5280;
end;
temp=w<(6);
%W=temp.*(1./w);
W=temp;
for i=1:n
for j=1:n
if isfinite(W(i,j))==0
W(i,j)=0;
end
end
end
%Row-standardize
W=normw(W);
148
W3=W;
W6=(w<(5*5280) & w>=(3*5280));
for i=1:n
for j=1:n
if isfinite(W6(i,j))==0
W6(i,j)=0;
end
end
end
%Row-standardize
W6=normw(W6);
%Options for SEM
info.lflag=0;
info.eigs=0;
%Options for SEM GMM
options.iter=1;
dlmwrite(’/Users/jasavage1/Documents/MATLAB/Neighbor/output 6.txt’,[ ...
y T myopic ext own ext neigh nw no herf gini prop six lon lat] );
dlmwrite(’/Users/jasavage1/Documents/MATLAB/Neighbor/W.txt’,W);
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